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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
It is often argued that it is easier and more cost effective to tackle conflicts before they reach 
the point of mass violence.  Yet estimated costs can be different from actual costs, and 
preventative actions may be unsuccessful or may simply delay the onset of violence.  
Moreover, when considering the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention (CP), the possibility 
has to be considered that, even without action, conflict may not take place. 
 
While the general argument for more resources for prevention and peace-building has 
considerable attraction at first sight, therefore, a more rigorous approach to estimating its 
cost and benefits is needed in order to be able to operationalise the concept.  Such an 
approach needs to take into account the predicted probabilities of conflict onset (both in the 
absence and presence of proposed CP measures), together with estimates of the expected 
costs of war and of preventative actions. 
 
The objective of this study is to develop such an approach, and to illustrate how it might be 
operationalised.  The project involves six case studies, three retrospective (on the Western 
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Rwanda) and three prospective (Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and 
Sudan).  All twelve CP Packages (two for each case study) are calculated to be cost-
effective for the international community: i.e., the anticipated cost savings from avoiding 
conflict exceed the costs of the CP Packages.  In all but one of these cases, moreover, the 
breakeven reduction in conflict probability is less than half the estimated reduction in 
probability.  This provides strong evidence for the finding that, in these studies, conflict 
prevention is cost-effective. 
 
Breakeven Probabilities for cost-effectiveness of CP Packages 
 
 
 
Two of the more cost-effective Packages are Sudan Package 1 and Uzbekistan Package 1, 
both of which take place in the ‘gestation phase’ of conflict, but estimates of conflict 
probability reduction depend critically, in both cases, on the willingness of political authorities 
to allow implementation.  The ability of the IC to carry out cost-effective CP packages in the 
‘gestation phase’ may therefore depend on its willingness to incur unquantified costs e.g. 
arising from trade-offs between short-term interests in co-operation with existing 
governments and long-term CP objectives. 
 
Perhaps the most effective CP package amongst those studied is the second Rwanda 
package.  The proposed military action was clearly feasible, did not depend on host 
government approval, and would almost certainly have achieved its defined objective of 
stopping the genocide, with all the other consequences that followed.  More generally, the 
cost-effectiveness of preventive military action is likely to be greater when the potential for 
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effective resistance is relatively small, and the size and duration of deployments can 
consequently be more limited. 
 
In determining the cost-effectiveness of CP to the IC, costs are divided into ‘discretionary’ 
and ‘non-discretionary’ costs.  The willingness of the IC to incur ‘discretionary costs’ is 
usually proportional to the level of ‘non-discretionary costs’ that could be incurred.  Countries 
with oil supplies, terrorist bases, high levels of foreign investment or large populations of 
potential migrants are more likely to be candidates for CP by the IC than countries with few 
of these global linkages. 
 
In all the studies, the costs of conflict to the directly-affected territory exceed those to the IC 
and to neighbours, usually by a very large margin.  While the main focus of this study is on 
the benefits and costs to the IC, taking into account the levels of costs to the directly-affected 
territory and its neighbours has a dramatic effect on the cost-effectiveness of CP.  The 
‘breakeven probability’ for all parties is less than 10% in eleven of the twelve cases being 
studied, and 5% or less in nine out of twelve.  In all the non-Afghan case studies, the costs of 
conflict to the directly-affected territory exceed those to the IC and to neighbours, usually by 
a very large margin. 
 
One consequence of basing costs to the directly-affected territory on GDP loss is that it leads 
to higher per capita cost estimates for middle-income conflict-affected countries, compared 
with low income countries.  Further work is needed to generate more equitable cost-
estimation methods, perhaps including the development of direct indicators of conflict impact 
on human security. 
 
The framework outlined here provides a new way to think about how to conceptualise CP 
policy and thereby can assist in the prioritising of activities, and in processes of reflecting on 
lessons learnt from previous successes and failures.  At the same time, further work is still 
needed to develop the methodology used in this study, e.g. in relation to conflict probability 
estimates, GDP costs to directly-affected territories, and non-discretionary costs to the 
international community. An initial discussion of these topics is included in the three attached 
Briefing Papers. 
 
This report has been made possible by funding from the UK Department for International 
Development.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this study is to provide an evidence base concerning the costs and benefits 
of conflict prevention (CP) activities (defined as those activities undertaken primarily to 
reduce the risk of conflict), compared with those of engaging after large-scale conflict has 
begun. 
 
It is often argued that it is easier and more cost effective to tackle conflicts before they reach 
the point of mass violence. It is now widely argued that it is easier and more cost effective to 
tackle conflicts before they reach the point of mass violence.  The UK Government, for 
example, recently argued that ‘preventing conflict is better and more cost-effective than 
resolving it’1 yet this claim is comparatively under-researched.  Existing studies on the cost-
effectiveness of prevention tend to point to cases where ex post the cost of inaction 
considerably outweighed the cost of hypothetical conflict prevention2 yet the results of such 
analysis can be misleading, since the results of inaction can never be known in advance and 
so the estimated costs are likely to be very different from the actual costs.  Conversely the 
benefits of prevention are also unknown. Preventative actions may be unsuccessful or may 
simply delay the onset of violence. Alternatively, even without preventative action, conflict 
may not have taken place. 
 
While the general argument for more resources for prevention and peace-building has 
considerable attraction at first sight, therefore, a more rigorous approach to estimating its 
cost and benefits is needed in order to be able to operationalise the concept.  Such an 
approach needs to take into account the predicted probabilities of conflict onset (both in the 
absence and presence of proposed CP measures), together with estimates of the expected 
costs of war and of preventative actions. 
 
The primary objective of this project is to be forward-looking, help in to inform decisions on 
investments on CP.  On a macro-level, it should contribute to discussions about the overall 
effectiveness and efficacy of conflict prevention, and to assessments about the 
circumstances in which particular instruments might prove more or less effective. At a micro-
level, it may also suggest lessons about how the international community might shape its 
current responses to particular potential conflicts. 
 
                                                 
1 DFID, FCO and MoD, The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A joint UK government approach to reducing conflict, The 
Stationery Office, London, 2003, p. 3. 
2  M. E. Brown and R. N Rosecrance (eds), The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1999; M. Renner, Budgeting for Disarmament; The Cost of War and Peace, 
World Watch, Washington DC, World Watch Paper 122, 1994; Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, 
Contemporary Conflict Resolution; the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 2000. 
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2. KEY FEATURES OF METHODOLOGY 
 
The project involves six geographical case studies, which are published in two separate 
working papers in this series.  This paper provides an analysis of the results.  Three are 
retrospective case studies (for the period 1988-2003) on the Western Balkans, Afghanistan 
and Rwanda.  All three locations experienced major conflicts during this period, but the 
nature of international response differed widely.  In Rwanda, response was limited and took a 
primarily humanitarian form.  In the Western Balkans, there was a wide-ranging international 
engagement in the conflict from the beginning, culminating in the deployment of international 
military force to bring the conflict to an end after 4 years of bloodshed.  In Afghanistan, the 
international community’s involvement was limited in character during 12 years of large-scale 
internal conflict, despite the massive flows of refugees into neighbouring countries.  Large-
scale military intervention only took place in response to the events of September 11 2001. 
 
Three prospective case studies (for the period 2004-2018) have also been completed, on 
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Sudan.  For each of these, we ask the question:  what mix of 
CP measures and instruments adopted by the international community would be most cost-
effective in preventing conflict if adopted now?  How do these compare with the possible 
costs of conflict?  The prospective studies were chosen to represent the range of scenarios 
with which international CP policy is expected to deal.  Sudan and Afghanistan have 
experienced protracted conflicts, but have now seen, or expect, important peace agreements.  
There are, however, very different current levels of international engagement.  Uzbekistan, 
by contrast, is not currently experiencing major armed conflicts.  Yet it faces serious 
governance and development challenges, which could over time create the conditions for 
large-scale conflict. 
 
For each of the geographical case studies, we have calculated the net benefit/cost of 
particular hypothetical ‘CP Packages’ to the international community.  The international 
community (IC) is defined to be all countries outside the immediate neighbourhood of the 
territories ‘directly affected’ by conflict.  For the purposes of the calculations in the study, the 
IC is assumed to be a unitary actor.  As we discuss in a later section, however, many of the 
obstacles to effective CP may arise because this is often far from being the case. 
 
The study also calculates the net benefit/cost of conflict and CP to the directly affected 
territories and to neighbouring territories.  These territories are defined in each case study.  
For each of the case studies, the specialist authors (in co-operation with the team leader, 
Malcolm Chalmers) constructed two plausible packages of CP measures that could have 
been (or could still be) undertaken by the international community, over and above actual or 
current efforts.  The packages are chosen so as to be reasonably representative of the main 
choices which, in principle, might have been (or still are) open to the international community. 
 
Each package is then broken down into its main components and its annual additional costs 
for the whole international community over the period of the study are estimated.  It is not 
assumed that any CP package would definitely have prevented, or will prevent, conflict.  
Rather, case study authors are asked to estimate by how much the package in question 
would have reduced the probability of conflict, and to justify their estimate. 
 
In order to estimate the costs of conflict to the international community, as well as to the 
directly affected territory and its neighbours, two scenarios are constructed for each case 
study: a ‘peace scenario’ and a ‘conflict scenario’.  These are chosen to be representative of 
a much wider range of possibilities.  The peace scenario sketches a plausible path to 
avoidance of large-scale violent conflict (although smaller-scale localised conflict is not 
excluded).  The conflict scenario sketches a plausible path to the emergence of large-scale 
violent conflict (or, in the case of the retrospective studies, what actually took place). 
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In order to facilitate standardised comparisons between them, all case studies are limited to 
a study of a period of 15 years: 1989-2003 (inclusive) for the retrospective studies and 2004-
2018 (inclusive) for the prospective studies.  This has meant that some of the CP packages 
that have been suggested to us (for example, in relation to Yugoslavia or Rwanda in the 
early 1980s) could not be considered.  In some cases, a significant part of the costs of 
conflict (and of CP) fall outside the 15-year time frame.  This is less of a problem in the 
retrospective studies, where the major conflict episodes occurred in the early 1990s (though 
Afghanistan is a partial exception to this rule).  In those prospective studies where major 
conflict is more likely to take place after 2010 (e.g. Sudan and Uzbekistan), however, this 
may tend to understate the costs of conflict.  Where the 15-year rule significantly affects our 
findings, therefore, we make this clear. 
 
All the financial data used has been converted into 2004 US dollars, using the US GDP 
deflator index to convert from cash dollar figures for retrospective case studies.  This reflects 
the value that society attaches to present, as opposed to future, consumption.  
 
In accordance with recommended HMT practice, we have also used a 3.5% real discount 
rate to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) of costs and benefits.3  In principle, it would be 
possible to apply a different discount rate for directly-affected territories and neighbours, 
compared with the international community.  This is unnecessarily complicating for a study of 
this nature, and we therefore assume a uniform discount rate for all actors.4
 
On the basis of available information and the elaboration of the relevant peace and conflict 
scenarios, each case study estimates annual cost figures over a 15-year period, which are 
then translated into NPV figures (in $2004) for the following:  
 
• Total NPV costs of conflict to the international community. 
• Total NPV costs of conflict to the directly-affected territory. 
• Total NPV costs of conflict to neighbouring territories. 
 
Each of these is calculated by estimating the net additional costs of the conflict scenario to 
the parties in question, compared with the peace scenario. 
 
Each case study also estimates the following: 
 
• Total NPV costs of CP Package 1 to the international community. 
• Total NPV costs of CP Package 2 to the international community. 
 
Annex 1 summarises the mathematical representations of these variables. 
 
This is not a study of possibilities for CP measures by the directly-affected territory or by 
neighbours.  No estimate is therefore made of costs of CP Packages to these parties (though 
in some cases, co-funding might be a key part of the process). 
 
The spreadsheets contained as Annexes to the case studies summarise the cost estimates 
made for these variables in the six case studies.  It then shows how these estimates are 
used to assess the cost-effectiveness of the CP Packages in question.  To do this, each case 
study estimates the probability of large-scale violent conflict (represented by the conflict 
scenario) taking place (at some time during the 15 years) in the absence of the Package 
being studied.  In the case of the retrospective studies, this probability is, by definition, 100%. 
                                                 
3  HMT The Green Book, Annex 6 
4  In countries with higher rates of consumption growth and/or lower life expectancy, one might expect higher real discount 
rates. 
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In the case of the prospective case studies, the probability varies somewhat, from 70% in 
Uzbekistan to 80% in Sudan.  Each case study then estimates the reduction in conflict 
probability that is achieved by the package under study.  In Sudan, for example, CP Package 
1 reduces this probability from 80% to 30%, and CP Package 2 reduces it from 80% to 15%.  
In the special case of Rwanda, where the second package is intended only to prevent the 
1994 genocide (and not the 1990-94 civil war) the estimate of a 78% probability reduction 
refers to the estimated reduction in the NPV cost of the total conflict scenario. 
 
The case studies have drawn on various sources (including lessons learned from other 
conflicts and understanding of key conflict actors and events) to estimate these probabilities. 
Yet the margins of uncertainty in these estimates (shown below) are, in some cases, 
considerable. 
 
The margins of uncertainty are relatively lower, for example, in two of the cases (Balkans 
CP2 and Rwanda CP2) where the preventive deployment of well-equipped military force is a 
central element of the package, but not in the second Afghanistan package, where this is 
also an important element.  This will be discussed further later in this paper. 
 
Table 1: Conflict Probabilities and CP Packages 
 
 
 
In order to further assess the cost-effectiveness of various CP packages, and reduce 
dependence on the specific probability estimates made above, the study also calculates a 
‘breakeven probability’ for each of the packages.  This is the reduction in probability of 
conflict which a given CP Package has to achieve in order for its additional cost to be 
equivalent to the likely savings to the international community.  Thus, in most cases, the 
estimated cost of a conflict to the IC is much greater than the cost of a Package designed to 
prevent it.  Yet if a package only reduces the probability of conflict by x%, the average 
savings to the international community are only x% of the NPV costs of conflict, while the full 
costs of the Package will have to be met. 
 
It is important to emphasise that it is the difference in probabilities brought about by the 
Packages that is of relevance to an assessment of their cost-effectiveness.  The example of 
Sudan CP Package 1 may help here.  In the absence of either of the Packages, the 
estimated cost to the IC of this conflict, if it takes place, is $18.2 billion.  But there is an 
estimated 20% probability that conflict will not take place, thereby reducing the total mean 
estimated cost to 0.8 x $18.2bn = $14.6bn.  If Package 1 is put in place, it costs $1.3b, but 
reduces the probability of conflict to 30%.  The total mean estimated cost to the international 
community is then $1.3bn + 0.3 x $18.2bn = $6.8bn: a savings of $7.8bn.  Thus the 
methodology employed here takes account of both (a) the possibility that conflict might not 
have occurred, even without the CP Package, and therefore that the Package turns out to 
have been ‘wasted’; (b) the possibility that conflict will still take place, even with the Package, 
and therefore that, again, it might be seen as a failure. 
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Calculations of breakeven reductions in probability of conflict have been calculated only in 
relation to the costs to the IC.  Yet all the conflicts studied impose costs on the directly-
affected territory that are significantly higher than those that fall on the IC.  To a much lesser 
but still significant extent, costs also fall on neighbours.  The assessment of the net benefits 
of the packages therefore estimates the likely savings to these parties of the Packages being 
examined, adjusted for the estimated reduction in conflict probability as a result of those 
Packages.  Thus, for example, Sudan Package 1 is estimated to save the international 
community a total of $7.9bn, but it would also save the directly-affected territory (i.e. Sudan) 
$37.8bn and its neighbours $2bn.  We have not sought to weight the benefits accruing to 
these different parties. 
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3. KEY FINDINGS: COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF CP PACKAGES TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (IC) 
 
Of the twelve CP Packages examined, all are estimated to be cost-effective for the IC: 
i.e., the anticipated cost savings from avoiding conflict exceed the costs of the CP Packages.  
In all except one of these cases, moreover, the breakeven reduction in conflict 
probability is less than half the estimated reduction in probability.  This adds to the 
robustness of the finding that conflict prevention would have been significantly cheaper than 
cure in all these cases.  
 
The one exception to this latter finding relates to the second retrospective CP package 
for Afghanistan (a similar finding is anticipated for the prospective Afghanistan study).  In 
this case, it has been assumed that the most propitious time for CP would have been in the 
immediate aftermath of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989, when a unified 
international intervention might have prevented the subsequent descent into a new civil war.  
But the main reason for the relatively high level of expense of CP in this study, and thus its 
poor cost-effectiveness, is that Afghanistan had already experienced a decade of civil war, 
had been heavily armed (on both sides) by foreign powers, and was facing considerable 
obstacles to a negotiated peace, not least because of this preceding conflict.  The sheer 
scale of the second CP Package (involving an initial deployment of 30,000 troops, and the 
provision of a level of ODA that would probably have made Afghanistan the world’s largest 
aid recipient in absolute terms) means that its projected costs are almost four times as great 
as those of the next largest of the other eleven Packages (the second Balkans package). 
 
The cost of this CP Packages may have been overstated, and it is worth noting that it is still 
marginally cost-effective to the IC, on the assumption that the probability of conflict can be 
reduced by 60%. Crucially, however, the case for the retrospective cost-effectiveness of CP 
for the international community in Afghanistan rests entirely on the assumption that 
Afghanistan’s war had a significant effect on the scale of international terrorism (including the 
9/11 attacks) and/or the global drugs problem. If such a relationship did exist, making even 
modest inroads into the costs of these global problems would have made CP worthwhile. In 
this study, we assume that the creation of a peaceful Afghanistan in the 1990's would have 
reduced the probability of 9/11 by 50%, reduced the total costs of dealing with international 
terrorism by 20%, and reduced the total costs incurred as a result of the international drugs 
trade by 5%. On these assumptions, both CP Packages would have been worthwhile to the 
IC at relatively low breakeven probabilities of success. If these costs are excluded, on the 
other hand, the retrospective cost-effectiveness of intervention to the IC in 
Afghanistan is very low indeed. 
 
It is also possible to devise a measure of relative cost-effectiveness, based on the ratio 
between expected NPV cost savings to the IC and estimated CP costs. This is summarised 
below:  
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Table 2: Cost-effectiveness of CP Packages5
 
 
 
 
On the basis of these figures, two of the more cost-effective Packages are Package 1 for 
Sudan and Package 1 for Uzbekistan.  From this, one might be tempted to draw the 
general conclusion that CP is particularly cost-effective when it takes place in the 
‘gestation phase’ of the conflict cycle, i.e. well before an anticipated conflict (even in 
Sudan, the probability of a revival of the central conflict in the short-term is assessed to be 
relatively low).  In both cases, the proposed CP Packages focus primarily on a combination 
of measures intended to promote accountable government, develop security sector reform 
processes, and encourage peaceful conflict resolution.  This conclusion should, however, be 
treated with some caution.  We believe that the estimates of cost are reasonable in both 
cases, and the confidence margins are not especially large.  But the estimates of conflict 
probability reduction depend critically, in both cases, on the willingness of local 
political authorities to allow their implementation.  For example, external support of any 
kind to opposition groups, human rights groups or independent media in Uzbekistan might 
well meet resistance. Similarly, the government is unlikely to view favourably the opening of 
OSCE field offices in the Ferghana Valley.  The ability of the IC to carry out highly cost-
effective CP packages in the ‘gestation phase’ of conflicts, may therefore often depend on its 
willingness to incur unquantified costs, e.g. arising from possible trade-offs between short-
term interests in friendly co-operation with existing governments and longer term prospects 
of CP.  These other costs should not be overstated, and our view is that (in Sudan and 
Uzbekistan at least) there are many potential entry points for effective CP that could be 
exploited given sufficient IC commitment.  If the IC is unwilling or unable to incur these other 
costs, the prospects of effective CP of this sort will be correspondingly reduced. 
 
Both the proposed CP packages for Rwanda also have very high benefit/cost ratios to 
the IC.  Package 1 is designed to take advantage of the opportunity that existed to terminate 
the civil war in late 1990, before it escalated and before it led to the militarisation / 
radicalisation of Rwandan society.  
 
It consists of a united international initiative to broker a peace settlement, backed up by an 
arms embargo, a small peacekeeping force and some limited financial support designed to 
soften the social impact of the economic crisis.  Package 2 is a military intervention in 1994 
that would have terminated the genocide in Kigali before it spread to the rest of the country, 
thereby avoiding not only mass killing, but also the subsequent destruction of infrastructure 
                                                 
5  The net savings figures are calculated by subtracting Package costs from gross savings. For the purposes of calculating a 
benefit/cost ratio, however, the gross figure is more appropriate. 
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and the refugee crisis.  The key to understanding the high (retrospective) cost-effectiveness 
of these packages is that 92% of the costs of the conflict scenario to the IC relate to the 
genocide and its consequences and only 8% to the civil war that had been underway since 
1990.6  The first CP Package is estimated to have only a 50% probability of stopping the civil 
war, but would have reduced the risk of the genocide by 90%.  Without the risk of the latter, 
the first package would have had a benefit/cost ratio to the IC of only 0.5: well below break-
even point.7
 
Perhaps the most obviously effective CP package amongst those studied, therefore, is 
the second Rwanda package.  The proposed military action was clearly feasible, did 
not depend on host government approval, and would almost certainly have achieved 
its defined objective of stopping the genocide, with all the other consequences that 
followed. 
 
The nearest parallel to the second Rwanda CP Package is the second Balkans CP Package.  
This involves the provision of a security guarantee to Bosnia and Croatia in 1991, as part of 
the decision to recognise them as independent states, and to underpin this with the 
deployment of sufficient military force to ensure the credibility of this guarantee against both 
external and internal opponents.  It is supported by a substantial programme of long-term 
development assistance, designed to consolidate the peace and prepare for the integration 
of the region into the wider European community of states.  This package is similar to the 
Rwandan one insofar as both involve the deployment of robust military force in order to 
contain an immediate crisis, neither required prior permission of all the parties to the conflict 
and both are assessed to have had a high probability of successfully achieving their 
objectives. 
 
Yet the second Balkans Package is also by far the most expensive of all the clearly profitable 
CP packages examined here.  The high cost of its military component reflects the 
assumption of a force equivalent in size and capability to the NATO force eventually 
deployed in Bosnia in 1995/96.  By comparison, the Rwandan ‘Package 2’ force is a tenth of 
the size and less heavily-equipped.  This may partly reflect undue caution in the Balkans 
case study and arguably even a force half the projected size could have had the required 
deterrent effect if deployed early enough.  But it largely reflects the greater military capability 
of potential adversaries in the Balkans compared with Rwanda.  A similar consideration 
applies in the retrospective Afghanistan study, where the large military force deployed in CP 
Package 2 reflects the perception (reinforced by US and NATO experience since 2001) that 
Afghanistan is a very difficult military environment in which to deploy.  Insofar as there is a 
lesson from these studies, therefore, it is that the cost-effectiveness of preventive military 
action is likely to be greater when the potential for effective resistance is relatively 
small and the size and duration of deployments can consequently be more limited. 
 
There may be another factor that explains the disparity in estimated costs of military 
intervention.  In both the Balkans and retrospective Afghanistan studies, the military costs of 
CP are derived, in considerable measure, by reference to the costs of later post-conflict 
interventions (in 1995 and 2001 respectively).  By contrast, studies that assume forceful 
military intervention in cases where none has taken place (e.g. Rwanda Package 2 and 
Sudan Package 2) generally assume a much lower level of cost.   
                                                 
6  By comparison, 23% of the costs to Rwanda itself relate to the civil war. 
7  The first CP Package would, however, have been cost-effective if the costs to Rwanda itself are taken into account. 
 Whereas this difference may have led to over-caution in estimating Balkan and retrospective Afghanistan costs, it may 
have led to over-optimism in Sudan, where the exact nature of the military challenges faced in Package 2 are hard to 
specify or cost. 
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Both the Balkans packages illustrate the considerable expense that can be involved in using 
economic assistance as a CP tool.  The first package is designed to stabilise the Yugoslav 
economy in its period of crisis in 1989-91 and thereby prevent the rise of extreme nationalism 
that subsequently led to war.  The second package also involves, in addition to security 
guarantees, substantial development assistance to the newly independent republics of 
former Yugoslavia.  In both cases, however, the costs involved in immediate economic 
stabilisation are relatively modest, and mostly take the form of partial write-off and 
rescheduling of external debts.  More crucial than the absolute size of the development 
programme provided in addition to this stabilisation package, moreover, would be its 
allocation in a conflict-sensitive manner.  Indeed, given the continuing potential for intra-
republican and inter-republican conflict, it would be essential that the programme is managed 
in such a way as to reduce rather than increase these tensions. 
 
By far the biggest component of the economic assistance component of the Balkans 
packages lies in their commitment to finance a move towards now-current levels of 
development assistance to the region.  Such a high level of assistance can be justified as CP 
insofar as it contributes to the long-term prosperity of the region, and helps in support its 
integration into the European Union, whose continuing enlargement is often, with some 
justice, described as its main contribution to CP.  Yet arguably a much lower level of 
economic assistance would have been enough to produce equivalent CP gains, once the 
immediate constitutional crisis of the early 1990s had passed.  Of course, such an 
investment might well have been justified in terms of the other non-CP benefits to the IC of a 
prosperous (ex-) Yugoslavia.  Yet it also highlights the importance, especially when 
examining the use of large-scale economic assistance as a CP tool, of being clear as 
to whether CP is the primary objective being sought.  When this is not the case, there 
is likely to be an increased danger that large aid programmes, even if they contribute 
to other objectives (such as GDP growth) in the short term, may exacerbate the 
potential for violence in conflict-prone societies. 
 
This leads us to some general remarks, based on the case-study research, that may shed 
some light on the relative cost-effectiveness of different CP instruments:  
 
• First, all the case studies showed that the timing of the CP Packages is critical to 
the chances of success in the retrospective studies.  In the case of the 
retrospective studies, this involved the creation of packages focused on particular 
‘windows of opportunity’ for external intervention, often coinciding with the 
perceived failure of domestic authorities to prevent the worsening of political, 
economic or security conditions.  Characteristically, this occurred either (a) when 
the gravity of the national political and economic crisis was already apparent to 
many key actors, but before mobilisation for armed conflict had got under way (as in 
both the Balkans packages); or (b) when limited armed conflict had already begun, 
but had not yet escalated (as in the first (and to an extent the second) Rwanda 
package).  This concern with windows of opportunity also informs the timing of the 
retrospective Afghanistan Packages, both of which focused on the opportunity, 
slight though it might have been, of a viable peace process in the immediate 
aftermath of Soviet withdrawal in 1989.  Perhaps because of the timing of the 
conflicts in all three locations, the packages in the retrospective studies tended to 
give a relatively lower priority to longer-term ‘structural’ CP, reflecting the limited 
time frame in which (with the benefit of hindsight we know) they had to operate. 
 
• The packages in the prospective case studies for Sudan and Uzbekistan, by 
contrast, are more concerned to promote longer-term processes of institutional and 
normative change that can reduce the future resort to political violence, reflecting 
the assessment that large-scale conflict is primarily a medium-term, rather than 
short-term, risk.   
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Both packages emphasise, however, that such longer-term processes must also be 
flexible and capable of rapid adaptation if they are to be successful in CP. Rather 
than a single fixed package of measures, they suggest a set of overarching 
objectives, under which a range of specific, and constantly adapting, measures are 
then developed as circumstances develop.  
 
• Both retrospective and prospective case studies, written in relation to both 
imminent and longer-term risks of conflict, emphasise the need for CP 
packages to be timely and flexible.  This in turn has important implications for the 
IC’s capability for rapid reaction across the board of CP instruments, including 
diplomacy, financial assistance, and military engagement.  Such a capability, in turn, 
requires the IC to have a sophisticated real-time understanding of the dynamics of 
conflict in the countries in question, together with mechanisms for identifying and 
contacting key actors, and for feeding ‘early warning’ of conflict into strategic 
decision making. 
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4.  KEY FINDINGS: VARIATIONS IN COSTS OF CONFLICT TO INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
 
So far, our focus has been on comparing the merits of different CP packages in different 
circumstances.  In determining the cost-effectiveness of CP to the IC, however, the costs of 
conflict are an equally important part of the equation.  These costs can broadly be divided 
into ‘discretionary costs’ and ‘non-discretionary costs’, corresponding roughly to the 
distinction between ‘wars of choice’ and ‘wars of necessity’.  
 
‘Discretionary’ costs refer to the costs which the IC (i.e. the donor community or ‘the West’) 
incurs by responding to conflicts in other parts of the world.  It includes the costs of refugee 
support, humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as post-conflict military 
intervention.  The cost-effectiveness of CP can be analysed solely in relation to these 
discretionary costs.  Yet the IC often declines to incur many of these costs, as the experience 
of Afghanistan in the 1990's illustrates.  Moreover, a strategy for CP that is based solely on 
reducing the discretionary costs of conflict to the IC faces the paradox that increased 
investment in CP can actually incur increased costs if conflict still breaks out, if only 
because some forms of preventive action often ties the intervening states into 
obligations (military, political, economic) from which it is not easy for them to extract 
themselves.  If the sole motive of CP was to save discretionary costs, therefore, the best 
strategy might be to entirely disengage from countries and regions in crisis, thus saving on 
both pre-conflict and post-conflict costs. 
 
Yet such a strategy, apart from being callous in its indifference to the human costs of conflict 
to those directly affected, also ignores the ‘non-discretionary’ costs of conflict to the IC, i.e. 
those costs which the IC will be forced to incur, whether it likes it or not, or at least will find it 
very hard to avoid. Examples in our case studies include: 
  
• Increased migration of asylum seekers from countries at war ( e.g. into the EU as a 
result of the Balkans war); 
 
• The direct consequences of international terrorism developing safe havens in ‘failed 
states’ (e.g. al Qaeda in Afghanistan); 
 
• The loss of oil company profits, and reduced international welfare more generally, 
as a result of disruptions to supplies from countries in conflict (e.g. from Sudan); 
 
• The increased availability of narcotics as a result of conflict and state failure (e.g. in 
Afghanistan). 
 
If properly foreseen, non-discretionary costs are often likely to be greater in magnitude than 
discretionary costs, and may consequently be given more weight in IC deliberations.  This 
tendency may, in some cases, be offset by the greater difficulty involved in costing non-
discretionary costs to the IC compared with discretionary costs.  Some ‘costs’ have offsetting 
benefits (e.g. increased immigration can have economic benefits, and increased oil prices 
may contribute to environmental objectives).  Other costs may be difficult to quantify, 
especially when (as in the cases of narcotics, and to a lesser extent international terrorism) 
production is geographically mobile and therefore relatively impervious to ‘supply side’ 
control.  On the other hand, the willingness of the IC to incur ‘discretionary costs’ is 
usually directly proportional to the level of ‘non-discretionary costs’ that are being 
incurred.  In the Balkans, the spill-over effects of conflict on Western Europe (in migration, 
organised crime, disruption of trade) had a direct bearing on the willingness of the EU and 
NATO to devote considerable resources to post-conflict stabilisation.  Despite the depth of 
the humanitarian crisis, the IC was unwilling to intervene in Afghanistan, and incur 
‘discretionary costs’, until the massive ‘non-discretionary’ costs of international terrorism 
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reached the US.  In Rwanda, similarly, the failure to intervene to prevent the genocide 
derived in large measure from the perception (fuelled by events in Somalia) that the IC could 
refuse to act without incurring any costs to itself. 
 
If the main driving force in calculations of the costs of conflict to the IC is the prospective 
level of ‘non-discretionary’ costs, it follows that the IC will be more willing, other things being 
equal, to invest in CP in those territories from which such costs are most likely to be 
generated.  Countries with vulnerable oil supplies, terrorist bases and high levels of 
foreign investment or large populations of potential migrants are therefore more likely 
to be candidates for cost-effective CP by the IC than countries with few of these global 
linkages.  
 
Yet one would have thought that these considerations would have led to the focusing of CP 
efforts on larger countries (like Nigeria, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Indonesia), since their 
descent into conflict would be likely to have much greater economic, strategic and 
humanitarian consequences than similar events in smaller countries.  In practice, however, 
both ODA and military intervention (and indeed the UK’s own CPPs) have tended to be 
disproportionately focused on smaller countries.  Our five case study countries have not 
bucked this trend, consisting of one small country (Rwanda) and four medium-size ones 
(Afghanistan, Balkans, Sudan, Uzbekistan), all with populations less than 35 million. 
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5.  KEY FINDINGS: COST-EFFECTIVENESS TO DIRECTLY-AFFECTED TERRITORIES 
AND NEIGHBOURS 
 
Although the main focus of this study has been on the benefits and costs to the IC, taking 
into account the levels of costs to the directly-affected territory and its neighbours has a 
dramatic effect on the cost-effectiveness of CP.  As Table 3 shows, once costs to all parties 
affected by a conflict are taken into account, the ‘breakeven probability’, i.e. the level of 
reduction in conflict probability at which CP becomes cost-effective, is reduced dramatically.  
The resulting breakeven for all parties is less than 10% in eleven of the twelve cases being 
studied and 5% or less in nine out of twelve cases.  In all the non-Afghan case studies, 
moreover, the costs of conflict to the directly-affected territory exceed those to the IC 
and to neighbours, usually by a very large margin. 
 
The main methodology used to estimate the costs to the directly affected territory and its 
neighbours is to compare the level of national income in the conflict scenario with the level of 
income that it is estimated would have been achieved, over the 15 year period, in the peace 
scenario.   
 
In addition, the case studies also estimate the additional costs, in conflict, of diverting some 
part of national income into conflict-related uses, including military spending and 
reconstruction.   
 
This methodology helps us encompass the wide range of economic effects of conflict, while 
avoiding the perils of double-counting.  It also takes into account the powerful effect of 
differential growth rates on the relative prosperity of countries (or scenarios, in this case). 
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Table 3: Break-even probabilities for CP Packages 
 
 
 
 
This methodology could be further refined, for example by including the costs of the human 
capital lost through deaths and injuries incurred as a result of the conflict.8  Yet a significant 
part of this cost (up to the end of the 15-year time period) should already be included, insofar 
as it impacts on projected or actual national income.  
 
One potentially worrying consequence of basing costs to the directly-affected territory on 
national income loss (which applies equally to calculations of the value of life based on lost 
potential output) is that it leads to much higher per capita figures for costs in relation to 
middle-income countries affected by conflict, compared with low-income countries.  This is 
illustrated below: 
 
                                                 
8  A useful example of such a calculation is contained in Nisha Arunatilake and Sisira Jayasuriya, ‘The Economic Cost of the 
War in Sri Lanka’, World Development, Vol 29, No.9, 2001, p. 1494. 
 
 21
Table 4: National income levels and costs to directly-affected territory and neighbours 
 
 
 
 
Of the conflicts studied, both the costs of the conflict to the directly-affected territory and the 
costs to neighbours are far higher in the Balkans than in any of the other cases: 9 and 3 
times as high respectively compared with Afghanistan, and 12 and 40 times as high 
respectively compared with Sudan.  Yet the death tolls in Afghanistan and Sudan were, or 
are projected to be, as high as those in the Balkans, and all three territories have comparable 
total populations (22m for former Yugoslavia, 25m for Afghanistan and 32m for Sudan).  The 
main reason why the estimated monetary costs of the conflict in the Balkans are so much 
higher, therefore, is that its per capita income (even after a decade of war) is between 7 and 
14 times as high.  As a consequence, the value of lost production, or destroyed infrastructure, 
is much higher.  A similar picture emerges when the economic impact on neighbours is 
examined. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are estimated to suffer three times as 
much cost from the effects of the Balkans war on their rate of growth as Iran does from 
hosting 3 million Afghan refugees at its own expense.  As a lower-middle income country, the 
cost of hosting refugees in Iran (the main cost of the Afghanistan conflicts included above 
that relates to neighbours) is significantly higher than in low-income countries bordering 
Rwanda and Sudan. 
 
While the intention of focusing more attention on this variable may be a humanitarian one, 
therefore, the consequence of doing so (at least if a methodology using income loss is used) 
would be to prioritise CP in middle-income conflict zones.  In the light of these comparisons, 
it is clear that further work is needed to generate more equitable methodologies for 
comparing potential costs to directly-affected territories if it is to become a more 
central criterion in comparing the cost-effectiveness of CP Packages.  Possibilities for 
doing so are discussed further in Annex 3 of this paper. 
 
With these misgivings in mind, each case study has also summarised available data on more 
direct indicators of human security (lives lost, serious casualties, refugees) and human 
development (life expectancy, education enrolment and HDI levels).  Yet the extent to which 
such data provides a useful means of comparing the costs of conflict to directly-affected 
territories remains uncertain.  Further work is needed, in particular, to develop direct 
indicators of the impact of conflict on human security.  The UNDP’s Human 
Development Index, while a useful corrective to an exclusive focus on GDP data, fails to take 
into account the crucial role that violence, and fear of violence, plays in determining the 
welfare of the poor. 
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Some important health warnings are also appropriate in relation to costs to neighbouring 
territories.  In some cases, estimates of these costs can be remarkably small, for example in 
Rwanda and Sudan.  This partly reflects the relatively self-contained nature of the conflict in 
those territories, or at least the complex nature of any possible spill-over effects.  But it also 
reflects the reality that the IC often picks up most of the cost of dealing with cross-border 
refugee flows, with migrants as a consequence often having net positive effects on their 
adopted homes.  As the case study of Rwanda’s subsequent interventions in Congo 
illustrates, moreover, spill-over effects can be economically beneficial, at least for the 
intervening state.  Nor are neighbours usually passive victims of conflict.  Like the IC, they 
are often active participants in the conflict, with a stake in a particular outcome and/or 
particular factions involved in the conflict.  Indeed, for example in the case of Afghanistan, 
one of the main obstacles to the success of the retrospective CP packages is the difficulty in 
reaching a consensus between Afghanistan’s neighbours (Russia, Iran and Pakistan) as to 
the best political solution for that country.  Intervention by an outside power (the US) can 
sometimes override this regional conflict dynamic, but only at considerable cost.  
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6. BURDENSHARING, LEADERSHIP AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK 
 
Our framework is based on the assumption of a single international actor.  Yet no such 
unitary actor exists, making it more difficult to generate the international and inter-
organisational agreement that is needed to undertake timely CP.  In practice, therefore, 
prompt action is more likely if a single powerful state (or, in some circumstances, 
organisation) takes a leading role in organising a response.  One of the clear conclusions 
from the literature on international intervention and CP is that prompt action is more likely if a 
single powerful state (or, in some limited circumstances, organisation) takes a leading role in 
organising a response: the US in Sudan and (in 2001) in Afghanistan, the UK in Sierra Leone, 
France in Ivory Coast.  Where national stakes are relatively limited, governments often seek 
to free-ride on the efforts of others, and nothing gets done.  This was certainly a key obstacle 
to effective CP in all three of our retrospective case studies.  Yet the problem is not simply 
one of apathy and free-riding within the context of shared objectives.  In some cases, for 
example Rwanda in 1991-94 and Afghanistan in 1990, the key international actors involved 
were pursuing objectives that were in direct conflict with each other, making any unified IC 
response impossible and greatly increasing the chances of conflict. 
 
States therefore undertake their own national cost-benefit calculations on the relative merits 
of different forms of intervention and non-intervention.  In order to assess whether the 
national cost/benefit relationship for CP measures for the UK (or indeed another outside 
power) is different from that for the international community as a whole, it is therefore 
necessary to estimate what share of costs and benefits are met by, or accrue to, the UK.  
Were the UK to consider taking a leading role in CP in one or more countries, it would find 
itself meeting most of the costs of CP, but only benefiting from a relatively small share of the 
benefits of peace, most of which would accrue to other international and domestic actors.  
‘Spending to Save’ is therefore difficult to operationalise for the UK in isolation, unless it is 
able to mobilise IC partners to fully share the CP burden.  UK leadership is most likely to be 
viable where the UK has a strong stake in a particular territory, e.g. as a result of ongoing 
ODA programmes and economic interests.   
 
At the same time, however, UK CP initiatives can arguably have wider benefits to the UK 
beyond the conflict in question, enhancing its global standing, responding to domestic 
political pressures for humanitarian actions, and building up credit with partners that can be 
spent on other issues of value to the UK.  
 
It is not easy to assess whether the UK currently contributes disproportionately to global CP, 
given its economic weight, and might thus feel others are ‘free-riding’ on its efforts.  When 
CP is financed through multilateral organisations, such as the UN or OSCE or EU, costs are 
shared on the basis of standard scales of assessment, and the UK's share of the costs is 
therefore roughly proportional to its economic weight.  When the UK provides other 
resources on a bilateral basis, its share varies considerably.  The UK spends more than the 
EU average or than Japan on defence, but less than the US.  It spends above the OECD 
average on ODA, though below the EU average. In any case, most defence and ODA 
spending does not have a connection to CP, and it is therefore hard to estimate what share 
of global CP spending is met by the UK. 
 
The area in which the UK contribution to international security, including CP, is most clearly 
disproportionate is involvement in military operations.  During the last ten years, the UK has 
borne a share of the costs of overseas military operations that is well above its relative 
economic weight, and it maintains a higher proportion of its armed forces outside national 
territory than any other state in the world.  Were this trend to continue, the UK has more to 
gain than other countries from measures that reduce the need for future military operations.  
On the other hand, it means that the UK could also be called upon to make a 
disproportionate contribution to the military dimension of CP activities.  This is especially the 
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case for the initial high-intensity phase of peace enforcement operations, in which the UK 
retains a significant comparative advantage. 
 
In principle, given the UK's high share of military intervention costs, a particularly cost-
effective form of CP expenditure might therefore be programmes designed to provide other 
countries with increased capacities for peace support operations.  Whether this is true in 
practice, of course, depends on whether the programmes deliver on their objectives.  
 
UK overseas military operations and ODA flows are geographically focused, and the extent 
of UK contributions to CP efforts will often depend on the synergy with, and between, these 
and other policy instruments.  The extent of the UK involvement in CP will also vary 
depending on the extent to which the region/country in question is seen to be of particular 
strategic/economic/etc interest.  Yet the scope of these interests at present are very broad, 
with, e.g., MDG interests in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, strategic and economic 
interests in the Greater Middle East, and growing economic and geopolitical interest in China 
and India.  A more helpful criterion may therefore be: where can a distinctly UK contribution 
to CP add value to efforts led by others?  In some cases, e.g. in North-East Asia, it may be 
that UK (and indeed European) contributions will remain marginal to those of more deeply 
engaged powers. 
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7.  AREAS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
 
Further work is required to refine the methodology and sources used for the case studies.  
We have identified three areas in particular where more research would be of value:  
 
a.  Objective and subjective measures of conflict probability.  Econometric literature is 
already available on the correlates and incidence of conflict.  It should be possible to 
situate the findings of this study in the context of this literature, explore how far 
econometric results can be used to inform conflict probability estimation in the model, and 
suggest ‘rules-of-thumb’ that might be used to systematise conflict probability estimation.  
 
b.  Valuing the costs of conflict to the directly affected party.  This study uses loss of 
GDP as its main proxy for the cost of conflict to directly affected territories and 
neighbouring states.  This has the effect of valuing the cost of conflicts to directly-affected 
middle-income countries at a higher rate than in low-income countries.  Further work 
could explore whether this relative weighting is consistent with other IC policy 
commitments (e.g. the MDGs), and could explore how an alternative valuation 
methodology might be developed.  This has important implications, not only for this study, 
but across the range of UK and international CP activities. 
 
c. Non-discretionary costs to the IC.  Much of the increased interest in CP relates to the 
possibility that conflict might generate costs to the IC that are unrelated to post-conflict 
intervention, for example through international terrorism, narcotics supply, oil supply 
disruption, etc.  Yet there is very little literature available that seeks to quantify these 
costs in relation to CP decisions. 
 
 
Annexes 2-4 of this paper provide some initial thoughts on each of these areas. 
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Table 5: Summary of Findings (all values at $m NPV, 2004 prices) 
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Annex 1: Methodological Note 
 
The purpose of each case study is to assess the relative cost-effectiveness to the 
international community of two alternative CP packages (CP1, CP2), compared both with 
each other and with a baseline case, which is an estimate of what would happen with no CP, 
case . In order to answer this question, each case study makes best estimates, based on 
the evidence available to them, of the following: 
0CP
 
P0 The cumulative probability of large-scale organised violence in the 
absence of the CP packages under study; 
 
Px   The cumulative probability of large-scale organised violence taking 
place, at some time during the 15-year time frame, if the CP package 
CPx under consideration in the case study are adopted; 
 
S0 (t) to S0 (t+15) The estimated annual monetary costs of the setback to the 
development of the directly affected territories as a result of the conflict 
scenario; 
 
C0 (t) to C0 (t+15) The estimated annual additional costs (for years x, x+1…x+n, where 
x+n<t+15) incurred by the international community in overcoming the 
setbacks to development of the directly affected territories as a result 
of this conflict, adjusted for the probability that the international 
community will accept responsibility for bearing these costs; 
 
I0 (t) to I0 (t+15) The estimated annual additional costs (for years x, x+1…x+n, where 
x+n<t+15) incurred by the international community in intervening after 
the onset of large-scale organised violence, in the absence of the CP 
packages under study, adjusted for the probability that the 
international community will intervene; 
 
PR1 (t) to PR1 (t+15) The estimated annual additional costs (for years x, x+1…x+n, where 
x+n<t+15) incurred by the international community in undertaking the 
CP packages under study;  
 
I1 (t) to I1 (t+15) The estimated annual additional costs (for years x, x+1…x+n, where 
x+n<t+15) incurred by the international community in intervening after 
the conflict has begun to involve large-scale organised violence, if the 
CP packages under consideration in the study are adopted, but conflict 
still takes place, adjusted for the probability that the international 
community will intervene. 
 
Assumptions and conventions 
 
• Although in practice decision makers may be faced with the risk of a wide variety of 
possible conflicts, of varying magnitudes, lengths and frequencies, we simplify this by 
asking case studies to use a single conflict scenario (in terms of magnitude, length 
and frequency) for the baseline, as well as a single peace scenario.  
 
• In order to calculate the NPV’s, we use the discount rate recommended in the HMT 
Green Book. All monetary values are in 2004 $. 
 
• In prospective case studies, t = 2004. In retrospective studies, t = 1989. 
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On the basis of these assumptions and estimates, the following numbers are calculated in 
Annex H: 
 
NPVIC (Cx) The net present value to the international community of the conflict 
scenario under consideration, compared with the peace scenario, 
calculated over the period t to t+15. 
 
NPVTER (Cx) The net present value to the directly affected territory of the conflict 
scenario under consideration, compared with the peace scenario, 
calculated over the period t to t+15. 
 
NPVNEI (Cx) The net present value to neighbouring territories of the conflict 
scenario under consideration, compared with the peace scenario, 
calculated over the period t to t+15. 
 
NPVIC (CPx) The NPV cost to the international community of the CP package under 
consideration, calculated over the period t to t+15. 
 
Break-even reduction  B(CPx) =  NPVIC (CPx) / NPVIC (Cx) 
in conflict probability 
for the IC   
 
estimated reduction in  ∆PR(CPx) = P0 - Px 
probability as result of 
CPx
 
Net savings to IC as  = NPVIC (Cx) x ∆PR(CPx) - NPVIC (CPx) 
result of CPx   
 
Savings to directly  = NPVTER (Cx) x ∆PR(CPx) 
affected territories   
 
Savings to neighbouring = NPVNEI (Cx) x ∆PR(CPx) 
territories   
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Annex 2: Objective and subjective measures of conflict probability 
 
The purpose of this annex is to situate the findings of the Spending to Save study in the 
context of recent academic literature, exploring how far econometric results are consistent 
with conflict probability estimation in the model, and suggest ‘rules-of-thumb’ that might be 
used to systematise conflict probability estimation in further case studies. 
 
The global probability of conflict over a 15-year period 
 
There is an extensive academic literature seeking to map trends in the incidence of conflict.  
For the purposes of data comparability, we use the widely-accepted definition of ‘major 
armed conflict’, which refers to all armed conflicts in which at least one of the actors is a 
government, in which there are at least 1000 battle-related deaths in total and in which there 
at least 25 battle-related deaths per annum.9  
 
Perhaps the most influential recent contribution to this quantitative work has come from 
studies of the causes of civil war by Collier, Hoeffler and associated researchers at the World 
Bank and elsewhere.  Using data covering 161 countries for the period 1960-99, Collier et al 
(2002) estimate that the typical developing country faced a risk of civil war outbreak of 
around 17% in each 5-year subperiod.  This probability is, however, highly path-dependent, 
with the probability of civil war outbreak in each time period being greatly increased if a civil 
war had recently taken place.  In order to translate this figure into a 15-year probability, 
therefore, it is necessary to construct a ‘risk tree’, in which the likelihood of repeated civil war 
outbreaks is taken into account.  We assume, using Collier et al (2002) data, that, if a country 
suffers civil war outbreak in the first 5 years of the 15-year period, it will have a 44% chance 
of suffering further outbreak in the second 5 years (and similarly for the second and third five-
year periods).  Consequently, countries that avoid civil war in one five-year period will have a 
lower than average (i.e. 17%) chance of subsequent civil war.  Taking this path 
dependency into account, Collier et al’s data suggest that an estimated 34% of all 
developing countries will experience the outbreak of civil war at least once over a 15-
year period. 
 
The Collier et al data does not include inter-state wars, of which there were 28 during 1960-
1999, primarily in the period before 1990.  Nor does it include six wars against colonial rulers 
that took place in the period before 1980 (Armed Conflict Database, 2003).  If these conflicts 
are taken into account, in addition to the 78 civil wars in the Collier et al model, the 15-year 
probability of conflict is increased.  Because the bulk of these wars took place before 1990, it 
may not make a significant difference to the global probability of conflict.  Yet it can be 
significant in particular countries and sub-regions.  The last six years have seen several 
significant inter-state wars, including international community interventions in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, a mid-scale conflict between India and Pakistan, and a major war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  In these cases, and in some others, the risk of inter-state war 
remains relevant.  
 
Probability estimates based on the Collier et al data can be compared with our own analysis 
of data for the most recent 15-year period for which complete data is available.  As Table 6 
shows, 34% of developing countries experienced a major armed conflict during 1988-
2002.  Of these 52 countries, only Eritrea (which became independent only in 1993) is 
recorded as having major inter-state war, but not major civil war, during this period. The 34% 
figure generated from this source is therefore comparable with that generated (for a longer 
time period) by Collier et al.  
                                                 
9  This means that large-scale inter-ethnic fighting in which the state is not involved (e.g. Nigeria in the 1990’s) is not coded 
as conflict. (Sambanis:19)  In many cases, however, the state may be thought to have played some indirect role in such 
fighting, raising questions about the correct coding.  
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Table 6: Conflict initiation during 1988-2002 in developing countries 
 
Income level (2002) Major 
Conflict 
Minor 
Conflict Only
No Conflict Total 
Low Income 32 (50%) 15 17 64 
Of which HIPC 20 (51%) 8 11 39 
Lower Middle Income 18 (33%) 4 32 54 
Upper Middle Income 2 (6%) 4 28 34 
Total Developing  52 (34%) 21 77 152 
 
Note: calculated from Uppsala Conflict Data, as reported in Mikael Eriksson et al (2003).  A 
Minor Conflict is defined as one with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, but less than 
1000 battle-related deaths in total.  
 
Estimating conflict probabilities: Stage 1 
 
In order to devise a ‘rule-of-thumb’ for calculating the 15-year probability in individual cases, 
it is also useful to take into account those factors that have been shown to have the clearest 
correlation with conflict probability.  Two factors appear to be particularly important: first, 
whether there has recently been a conflict in the country in question; second, the country’s 
per capita level of income.  
 
There is a 44% probability of recurrence within five years of the end of a previous conflict.  
Even if the conflict risk premium declines to zero after five years, therefore, this still leaves 
(using a ‘risk tree’ analysis) an aggregate 15-year risk of conflict of 61% in countries that 
have recently experienced it.  By contrast, in the 83% of developing countries that have not 
experienced conflict in the last five years, the 15-year risk is only 28%. 
 
As Table 6 suggests for the most recent 15 years, upper-middle income countries are much 
less likely to suffer conflict than lower-middle income countries, who are in turn significantly 
less likely to suffer conflict than low income countries.  The probability of conflict in HIPC 
countries was no higher than in other LIC’s, however, so it is not suggested that HIPC status 
should be an extra conflict indicator. 
 
To some extent, the correlation shown in Table 6 may reflect the extent to which end-period 
income levels are a consequence, rather than a cause, of conflict during the previous 15 
years.  Since they are historical, moreover, they are not necessarily a guide to future trends.  
Nevertheless, they can provide a useful starting point for the construction of a ‘rule-of-thumb’ 
based on the two main conflict-determining variables we identify here.  
 
In Table 7, we show such an illustrative matrix.  In order to construct this matrix, we have 
assumed that a recent prior conflict increases the probability of conflict by the same 
proportion in all three income groups.  These illustrative figures are consistent with the 
‘conflict trap’ model in Collier et al (2002), in which conflict is increasingly concentrated in a 
group of marginalised low and lower-middle-income countries.  By contrast, almost all upper-
middle income countries, and most lower-middle income countries, face a relatively low 
conflict probability over the next 15 years.  
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Table 7: 15-year conflict probability  
 
Initial Income level (2002) Major Conflict in 
last five years 
No Major Conflict in 
last five years 
Total 
Low Income (64) 80% 37% 50% 
Lower Middle Income (54) 61% 28% 33% 
Upper Middle Income (34) 11% 5% 6% 
Total Developing  61% 28% 34% 
 
Table 7 focuses on the two variables that appear to be most universally linked to conflict 
probabilities.  In order to refine probability estimates at a country level for the purposes of 
employing the Spending to Save methodology, analysts can use this as a baseline, and then 
assess whether there are specific characteristics of the country under consideration which 
might increase or decrease its conflict risk above the expected level for a country of a given 
income level and conflict history.  
 
In principle, this assessment could include a more ‘fine grain’ assessment of where countries 
are situated in relation to the broad income and conflict categories.  In relation to income 
levels, however, the data do not suggest a sufficiently strong relationship between conflict 
risk reduction and income growth to make such a differentiation worthwhile within the 
categories.  The risk of conflict in HIPC countries is no higher than in LICs taken as a whole.  
Nor is there clear evidence of a lower conflict risk amongst the higher-income LMCs.10  
Moreover, it should be noted that figures for GNI per capita, both using the Atlas method (as 
here) or using PPP, are subject to significant margins of uncertainty, given difficulties 
involved in measurement, exchange rate determination and so on. 
 
The stark division between countries that have, or have not, experienced major conflict in the 
last five years could also, in principle, be broken down into more fine-grained categories (with 
the risk of renewed conflict, for example, greater for those where a conflict took place 6 years 
ago greater than those who have experienced none for 15 years).  It is probably more 
important, however, to conduct a qualitative assessment of the extent to which the problems 
that contributed to past conflict have been successfully addressed.  This can only be done by 
an assessment of the country in question, looking at the nature of the peace settlement, if 
any, and how far progress has been made in creating a stable new political and security 
order. 
 
Estimating conflict probabilities: Stage 2 
 
We have considered the possibility of adding other variables to this matrix, but recommend 
that this not be done, both because of the methodological complexity it would involve, and 
because no other variables appear to provide as powerful an explanation of conflict 
probability as the two already included.  As one of the co-authors of the WB Conflict Trap 
study has reminded us, moreover, causation does not show correlation, and case study-
based process tracing is necessary if the latter is to be used to demonstrate the former 
(Sambanis, 2003).  
 
It is worthwhile briefly reviewing these additional variables, however, as they are still worth 
taking into account in a more qualitative fashion when conducting country-level vulnerability 
studies.  Amongst the variables that global econometric studies have estimated (or 
hypothesised) as correlated with conflict are the following: 
 
                                                 
10  Five out of seven LMCs with GNI per capita of $2000-2935 (the upper band of LMC status) experienced a major conflict in 
the last 15 years.  
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• Societies where the dominant ethnic group is between 45% and 90% of the 
population are estimated to have a 50% higher probability of conflict. (Collier et al: 58).  
At the same time, a wider degree of ethnic and religious diversity may actually reduce 
the probability of conflict.  
 
• Countries with a level of dependence on primary commodity exports of around 30% 
of total GDP appear to face a heightened risk of conflict, compared with those with 
significantly lower (or higher) levels of dependence. (Collier et al). 
 
• Countries with high levels of per capita growth are less likely to face conflict than 
those with low or negative levels. (Collier et al) 
 
• Countries with a larger population are more likely to suffer conflict (the death 
threshold for conflict is defined in absolute, not proportional, terms), but the risk and 
size of conflict does not increase proportionately with population size.  Hence a 
region with many smaller countries (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) is likely to incur a larger 
number of conflicts. (Elbadawi & Sambanis) 
 
• Countries with high levels of inter-regional inequality are more prone to conflict. 
(Sambanis, 55) 
 
• States face a particularly high risk of warfare in the first year after independence, as 
has recently been shown in the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and East 
Timor. (Collier et al) 
 
• Strong and authoritarian states may be less prone to civil war than average 
developing countries (Sambanis, 23).  New and ‘immature’ democracies, by contrast, 
appear to face the greatest risk of warfare (Gurr, Henderson & Singer).  Political 
instability also increases the risks of war, but political liberalisation can achieve a 
greater reduction in the risk of civil war in polarised societies than economic 
liberalisation. (Elbadawi & Sambanis) 
 
• A high quality of policy and institutions, as measured (for example) in the World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), can reduce the chances 
of conflict. (C&H).  
 
• The existence of large migrant communities in neighbouring countries, which may 
provide support to rebellions, increases the risk of conflict. (C&H) 
 
• Significant neighbourhood spillover effects can be observed in many civil war 
outbreaks, most recently in the Balkans, West Africa, Horn of Africa, East Timor/Aceh 
(Sambanis, 43).  The nature of these effects is often linked to the presence of cross-
border ethnic communities.  
 
• The existence of charismatic leaders, when they are particularly committed to the use 
of violence to achieve political ends, can increase the chances of conflict. (Sambanis, 
50)  The importance of individual leaders may have been a key factor, for example, in 
the outbreak of World War Two and in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. 
 
• The extent of international community involvement in providing security, either 
through UN peacekeeping forces or other means, will also have a (normally pacifying) 
impact on the risk of conflict.   
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There is a good case for arguing that each of the variables listed above plays a role in 
determining conflict outbreak.  Yet their relative weighting remains highly contested and often 
dependent on difficult coding decisions.  Rather than asking those conducting country risk 
assessments to include some or all of these correlations in a multiple-variable quantitative 
risk assessment, therefore, we recommend a mixed model, in which a check list of 
‘secondary risk factors’ is created, and then used to make a qualitative judgement (based on 
country knowledge) as to whether the baseline risk assessment derived from Table 2 should 
be adjusted in some way.  This ensures that analysts are reminded to take into account the 
most obvious risk factors, while also retaining the essential element of qualitative and 
country-based judgement.  
 
Towards a framework for estimating probabilities within the Spending to Save model 
 
Our proposal for the systematisation of 15-year conflict risk assessment is therefore three-
fold: 
 
• Firstly, the allocation of the country in question to one of the six baseline categories in 
Table 7, according to its recent conflict history and income level.  
 
• Second, an assessment of where the country in question is placed (compared with 
others in the same baseline category) on other indicators of conflict-proneness. 
 
• Third, a qualitative judgement, reached after explicit consideration of the above, of 
the risk of conflict over the next 15 years.  
 
 
Table 8: An Illustrative Conflict Risk Assessment: Zambia 
 
Factors Coding Comment 15-year risk of 
conflict 
Baseline: income 
and recent conflict 
LIC – No recent 
conflict 
 37% 
Dominant ethnic 
group: 45-90% of 
population 
No Diverse ethnic 
groups 
-10 
High dependence on 
commodity exports  
Yes 25% but falling. +5 
Decline in per capita 
GDP over last 
decade 
Yes  +10 
Large population  No  -5 
Inter-regional 
inequality 
Yes  +5 
In first year of 
independence 
No  - 
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Immature democracy No Better than LIC 
norm 
-2 
Political instability No Less than norm -5 
Low CPIA score No Near norm - 
Migrant communities 
in neighbours 
No  -2 
Conflicts in 
neighbours 
Yes Angola, DRC, 
Zimbabwe 
+10 
Violent leaders No  -3 
International 
peacekeeping forces 
No  +3 
Other factors   -7 
Judgement of 
conflict probability 
  30% 
 
An illustration of how this might work is shown in Table 8.  It should be emphasised that the 
assessments here are not based on detailed study of the case of Zambia and are therefore 
intended only to demonstrate how the methodology might be applied.  
 
Applying the risk assessment framework to the Spending to Save prospective case 
studies 
 
The 15-year probability of conflict in the absence of CP was assessed at 80% in the 
Spending to Save case studies for Afghanistan and Sudan, and 70% in the case study for 
Uzbekistan.  In Tables 9, 10 and 11 we illustrate how these estimates are consistent with the 
framework we have just outlined.  The conflict risk in Uzbekistan is assessed at a rather 
lower level than in the other two cases in large part because it has not experienced a major 
conflict in the recent past.  The probability of major conflict in Afghanistan is assessed at less 
than 100% only because of the large external contribution of military forces and ODA in the 
‘baseline’ scenario.  The assessment for Sudan reflects a mixed message as to the role of oil 
in both conflict generation and potentially conflict resolution.  It should also be noted that, in 
this case, the probability of southern secession plays a key role in any assessment.  
 
Modelling the duration and scope of conflict 
 
Each case study in the Spending to Save model is organised around a single representative 
‘conflict scenario’, which is then contrasted with a single ‘peace scenario’.  While, in principle, 
the model could incorporate analysis of a multiplicity of conflict possibilities, doing so would 
add a level of complexity that could detract from the utility of the approach.  The probability 
estimates used in the case studies are not, strictly speaking, the probabilities of any conflict 
breaking out in the country in question, but the representative probability of the conflict 
scenario breaking out. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, the representative scenario is 
full-scale civil war, and a lesser level of conflict (say less than 300 conflict casualties per 
annum) would therefore be seen as conflict avoidance.  
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At the same time, the costs of conflict, and thus the benefits of CP, are often related to 
variations in the duration and intensity of conflict.  Insofar as CP activities are able to reduce 
the duration of conflict, for example, they can reduce the number of conflicts underway 
globally at any one point in time. (Collier et al).  If CP activities can contain the geographical 
spread of a conflict, or the level of damage incurred, they may also be worthwhile, even if 
conflict continues at a reduced level.  Rather than use a multiplicity of conflict scenarios, 
however, the model incorporates changes in the nature of the conflict scenario in a particular 
case study as changes in the probability of conflict.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Based on a survey of the literature on the correlates of conflict break-out, this paper has 
suggested a framework for conflict probability assessment that could be of value in further 
Spending to Save case studies.  Although this framework is not a substitute for country-level 
analysis, it does provide a useful tool for strengthening such analysis, and for facilitating 
cross-country comparisons.  
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Table 9: Applying the Conflict Risk Assessment: Afghanistan 
  
Factors Coding Comment 15-year risk of 
conflict 
Baseline: income 
and recent conflict 
LIC –Recent 
conflict 
 80% 
Dominant ethnic 
group: 45-90% of 
population 
Yes Fear of Pashtun 
dominance key factor
+5 
High dependence on 
commodity exports  
Yes Opium key 
destabilising factor. 
+10 
Decline in per capita 
GDP over last 
decade 
? Recent increase, 
though largely 
narcotics 
- 
Large population  - mid-sized  
Inter-regional 
inequality 
No  -5 
In first year of 
independence 
No  - 
Immature democracy Yes Worse than norm +10 
Political instability Yes Worse than norm + 10 
Low CPIA score Yes Near post-conflict 
norm 
- 
Migrant communities 
in neighbours 
? Declining as refugees 
return 
-5 
Conflicts in 
neighbours 
No Not significant  
Violent leaders Yes Warlords, Taliban +10 
International 
peacekeeping forces 
Yes  -20 
Other factors Yes High ODA -15 
Judgement of 
conflict probability 
  80% 
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Table 10: Applying the Conflict Risk Assessment: Sudan 
 
Factors Coding Comment 15-year risk of 
conflict 
Baseline: income 
and recent conflict 
LIC – recent conflict  80% 
Dominant ethnic 
group: 45-90% of 
population 
Yes Central bipolar 
conflict 
+10 
High dependence on 
commodity exports  
Yes Rising oil 
dependence 
+10 
Decline in per capita 
GDP over last 
decade 
No Rising due to oil -20 
Large population  Yes mid-sized +5 
Inter-regional 
inequality 
Yes Multiple risks +5 
In first year of 
independence 
Yes? Risk in event of 
southern 
independence 
+10 
Immature democracy No Not democratic -10 
Political instability No Norm for group - 
Low CPIA score No Near norm - 
Migrant communities 
in neighbours 
No No more than 
norm 
- 
Conflicts in 
neighbours 
Yes Uganda, 
Ethiopia, DRC, 
+5 
Violent leaders Yes Rather more 
than norm 
+5 
International 
peacekeeping forces 
No Not in baseline - 
Other factors   -20 
Judgement of 
conflict probability 
  80% 
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Table 11: An Illustrative Conflict Risk Assessment: Uzbekistan 
 
Factors Coding Comment 15-year risk of 
conflict 
Baseline: income and 
recent conflict 
LIC – No 
recent 
conflict 
 37% 
Dominant ethnic group: 45-
90% of population 
Yes Tajik / Kyrgyz 
minorities 
+10 
High dependence on 
commodity exports  
Yes? Cotton, but not 
conflict factor. 
-10 
Decline in per capita GDP 
over last decade 
Yes But recently 
stabilised? 
- 
Large population  ? Mid sized - 
Inter-regional inequality Yes Poverty in 
Ferghana 
+10 
In first year of 
independence 
No  - 
Immature democracy No  -5 
Political instability Yes  +5 
Low CPIA score No Near norm - 
Migrant communities in 
neighbours 
Yes  +5 
Conflicts in neighbours Yes  +5 
Violent leaders Yes Both government 
and radical 
opposition 
+15 
International peacekeeping 
forces 
No  - 
Other factors   - 
Judgement of conflict 
probability 
  72% 
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Annex 3: Valuing the costs of conflict to directly affected territories  
 
The Spending to Save study uses loss of GDP as the main measure for the cost of conflict to 
directly affected territories and neighbouring states.  This has the effect of valuing the cost of 
conflicts to directly-affected middle-income countries at a higher rate than in low-income 
countries.  This annex will examine whether this relative weighting is consistent with other IC 
policy commitments (e.g. the MDGs) and will explore how an alternative valuation 
methodology might be developed.  
 
Voters and foreigners 
 
The Spending to Save project is primarily intended to look at the costs of conflict and CP for 
the ‘international community’, which is defined as being all countries other than the directly 
affected territories and neighbouring states.  At the same time, the case studies have 
separately estimated the costs of conflict, and CP, to directly affected territories and their 
neighbouring states.  
 
In order to estimate the relative valuation that is to be given by the IC to these two types of 
costs, it is reasonable to assume that the IC places some positive valuation on the welfare of 
the citizens of countries affected by conflict.  It is less clear, however, how this valuation 
compares to that given to the welfare of their own citizens.  If one referred only to the stated 
objectives of development policy (e.g. the MDGs and the poverty-focus of development 
agencies), then a relatively high (though not equal) weighting might be given.  If aid and 
trade policies, rather than statements, are taken as indicative of ‘revealed preferences’, then 
the weighting is clearly much lower.  
 
Any attempt to estimate the relative weights that decision-makers give to the welfare of 
foreigners and their own electorates, therefore, comes up against an apparent disjuncture 
between principle and practice.  It is not possible to resolve this problem technically.  The 
Spending to Save model therefore separately estimates costs to the IC, and to directly 
affected territories and neighbouring states, leaving it to decision-makers to decide the 
relative weight to give to the welfare of these different groups.  
 
GDP loss as a measure of the costs of conflict to directly affected territories  
 
Armed conflict typically generates a wide range of economic costs, including the destruction 
of public and private assets, the disruption of transport links, the breakdown of social trust, 
the flight of capital and people and the deterioration of economic policy.  The nature and 
extent of these costs vary considerably, as does their distribution between individuals and 
groups.  Even as some suffer, others might gain from conflict.  Conflict might also sometimes 
result in improved economic performance and policy (as was arguably the case in Rwanda), 
although this does not appear to be the norm. (Hoeffler & Reynal-Querol (2003): 11)  
 
Many of the economic effects of conflict are overlapping and interacting.  An estimate of 
aggregate economic impact derived mainly from the addition of known effects, therefore, is 
likely to result in double-counting, as well as the possible omission of significant unquantified 
effects.  The Spending to Save model seeks to minimise these potential methodological 
problems by using the loss of potential annual GDP as the basic numeraire for the costs of 
conflict.  Information available on specific economic effects, for example asset destruction or 
capital flight, can then be used to inform a better estimation of GDP trends.  
 
The use of GDP loss also helps to avoid potential problems related to the proper valuation of 
capital losses.  The current economic value of capital assets is the NPV of the income flows 
that they will generate in future.  In practice, estimates of asset destruction often use historic 
cost valuations, which may overstate potential income flows in cases where assets would 
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have soon become obsolete, even in the absence of conflict.  Most of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, for example, suffered a sharp GDP decline in the early 1990s as the 
peaceful transition to a market economy destroyed the value of assets designed for a 
different pricing structure.  In order to estimate the economic loss incurred by conflict in the 
Balkans case study, therefore, it was necessary to assume that it would have incurred 
significant GDP losses even in the absence of conflict as a result of the transition to a market 
economy and the related obsolescence of much industrial capital.  The costs of conflict were 
then estimated as the difference between this peacetime GDP trend and the actual war-
affected GDP levels.  
  
This use of GDP trends as the main numeraire is consistent with that used in Collier & 
Hoeffler (2004).  The experience of writing the Spending to Save case studies in co-
operation with country experts suggests that this methodology is readily understandable by 
non-economists and produces results that can be placed in comparative context with relative 
ease.  The use of aggregate GDP trends is also more likely to capture the enduring impact of 
conflict on economic development.  Historical experience suggests that countries may never 
regain the levels of GDP that they could reasonably have expected to reach by a given date 
had they remained at peace.  The countries of Central America, for example, are now 
significantly less well-off (20 years later) than they would have been without the civil wars of 
the 1980s.  
 
The shift to subsistence production  
 
The literature on the economic effects of conflict suggests a common tendency towards a 
shift from production for the market to production for subsistence or barter, alongside a shift 
from legal to non-legal and criminal activities.  Studies of possible GDP loss need to be 
aware of this tendency, as it has the potential for overstating the decline in human welfare as 
a result of conflict, and thus the gains consequent upon subsequent marketisation and 
legalisation.  Perhaps the most dramatic example of this trend in our case studies is the 
growth of the narcotics economy in Afghanistan during its long civil war, to such an extent 
that opium production now accounts for an estimated 40% of national income.  Successful 
CP in Afghanistan can be expected to reduce this production.  In calculating the cost-
effectiveness of CP for the population of the directly affected territory, therefore, the losses of 
opium-related income may have to be set against projected gains in legally-earned GDP. 
 
Timescale of GDP loss 
 
The Spending to Save methodology limits itself to a 15-year time scale: 1989-2003 for 
retrospective case studies and 2004-2018 for prospective case studies.  It therefore 
understates the costs of conflict (and in some cases CP) where these can be expected to 
extend beyond this period.  Where conflict occurs at the beginning of the period, and the 
main costs of conflict are incurred immediately thereafter, this may be less of a problem.  In 
several case studies, however, conflict occurs in the middle of the period and significant 
costs are expected after its end.  Sudan and Uzbekistan are examples of this.  In the case of 
the retrospective Afghanistan case study, moreover, many of the costs of the 1990s civil war 
to the IC were incurred after 2003, in the form of high levels of ODA and military deployments.  
Even after a discount rate is applied, the inclusion of these post-period costs could make a 
significant difference to the overall cost-effectiveness of CP. 
 
Bearing this experience in mind, future Spending to Save case studies might consider 
extending the time period of the cost-effectiveness calculation to 20 or 25 years, where it is 
felt that significant additional costs might be incurred in these end-years.  
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GDP diversion 
 
In addition to estimates of GDP loss as a result of conflict, the Spending to Save model also 
makes an allowance for the diversion of GDP into ‘non-productive’ activities such as military 
spending.  It does so by comparing the level of such spending in the conflict scenario 
(including the post-conflict period) with its level in the peace scenario and using the 
difference as a resource diversion effect of conflict.  This is consistent with the methodology 
used in Collier and Hoeffler (2004).  
 
Although this methodology is generally sound, it needs to be applied with care, taking into 
account the particular circumstances of each case study.  It assumes that no additional 
welfare is generated from the extra military spending in the conflict scenario, except insofar 
as this is a direct consequence of requirements generated by the conflict itself.  Yet 
increased military spending can, in some cases, generate other benefits, including 
enhancement of dual-use physical infrastructure, protection of national economic assets, 
improved policing and greater deterrence of future rebellions.  In evaluating the diversion 
effect, therefore, case study authors should not assume that all domestic military spending is 
‘non-productive’, even if increased military spending as a result of conflict can normally be so 
classified.  
 
Distributional weightings within directly affected territories  
 
The use of GDP as a measure of welfare assumes that the same utility is generated by every 
dollar of income, irrespective of the total income of the recipient.  While this assumption is at 
odds with the assumption of a diminishing marginal utility of income, GDP gain or loss can 
still provide a useable proxy for proportional gain or loss in welfare in circumstances where 
the distribution of income remains constant.  
 
Yet conflict is often characterised by rapid changes in the distribution of both income and 
property.  The differential impact of a conflict on income groups will depend on its particular 
characteristics, with some conflicts disproportionately affecting urban and/or propertied 
classes, and others bearing most heavily on poor peasant populations.  Post-conflict 
recovery is also often characterised by new patterns of income distribution, often very 
different from those prevailing in the pre-conflict period.  Although the recent focus of 
attention has been on conflicts which hurt the poor disproportionately, this need not always 
be the case, e.g. when conflict settlement is accompanied by asset redistribution or state 
appropriation.  
 
Where there is no strong evidence to suggest that particular income groups have suffered 
disproportionate income losses or gains, GDP loss remains the best indicator of welfare loss.  
Where evidence of considerable redistribution is present, however, it would in principle be 
better to adjust GDP estimates to take into account the marginal utility of income (MUI) of 
different income groups within the same country.  It is generally accepted that marginal utility 
declines as income rises and recent academic research has focused on estimating the 
elasticity of this relationship.  HM Treasury (2003) concludes, based on Cowell and Gardiner 
(1999) and other studies, that marginal utility is inversely proportional to the income of the 
recipient, i.e. ‘an extra £1 of consumption received by someone earning £10,000 a year will 
be worth twice as much as when it is paid to a person earning £20,000 per annum.’ (HM 
Treasury (2003): Annex 5, p. 11).  On the same assumption, the loss of $10 in the income of 
those earning $100 per annum is worth ten times the loss of $10 by those earning $1000 per 
annum.  
 
It may be difficult to apply a system of distributional weights in circumstances where data on 
the differential impact of conflict on income groups is not readily available.  Where sufficient 
data is available to suggest that some income groups lose, or gain, disproportionately from 
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conflict, however, such a system could provide a means of adjusting GDP estimates to take 
these effects into account.  
 
International distributional weightings 
 
If one were to assume a single world ‘welfare community’, then one could estimate a global 
utility function similar to the national utility function used in the previous section. With 
marginal utility inversely proportional to income, an international weighting of income gains 
(or losses) might then look as follows: 
 
Table 12: Weighting of marginal income, using a global utility function 
 
Country Mean income level 2002 (GNI 
per capita) 
Marginal Utility of 
Income (where UK = 100) 
Rwanda $     230 109.8 
Bosnia $  1,270 19.9 
UK $25,250 1 
 
 
This hypothetical utility function is very far from the stated principles, far less the reality, of 
current IC / OECD policy.  This is because there is a sharp distinction between the (weak) 
nature of community and mutual obligation that exists within the global polity and the 
stronger (albeit variable) manifestations of such community within national societies.  
Governments give much higher priority to the welfare of those who elect them over that of 
those who do not.  This also has important implications for the organisation of burdensharing 
within the ‘international community’, insofar as the UK government is likely to place as little 
value on increasing welfare in Japan or the US as it does in Rwanda or Bosnia, compared to 
the high weighting given to its own citizens.  We discuss the problems this creates for 
burdensharing in CP in the main text of the report.  
 
Yet the overwhelming priority that governments give to their own citizens does not mean that 
the concept of a global utility function is irrelevant, only that it may only have value when 
comparing the welfare of different foreign countries.  In the case of international 
organisations, moreover, all countries are ‘foreign’, and such a function can therefore have 
universal value, within the constraints of the resources which have been made available to 
those organisations.  
 
Thus, for example, it would be possible to use international distributional weights to assess 
the relative costs and benefits of investing in CP in Bosnia and Rwanda from the point of 
view of the IC.  This would mean that a $127 (or 10%) reduction in an individual’s income in 
Bosnia would be valued as equivalent to a $23 (or 10%) reduction in an individual’s income 
in Rwanda.  
 
This rule-of-thumb would be consistent with the poverty-selectivity of donors such as the UK, 
which is increasingly concentrating its ODA on low-income recipients, and with the focus of 
the MDG’s on reducing poverty, as measured by a global income threshold.  By focusing 
policy intervention on those earning less than $1 or $2 a day, these donors are implicitly 
using a method of discriminating between developing countries in a manner compatible with 
a unified global utility function.   
 
In practice, the impact of conflict on the GDP of the directly affected territories and 
neighbouring states is only part of the calculation of the cost-effectiveness of CP, with other 
non-discretionary and discretionary costs likely to loom much larger.  Insofar as an attempt is 
made to take the former into account, however, utility theory suggests giving a higher weight 
to the absolute GDP benefits that accrue from CP in low-income countries, compared to 
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those in middle-income countries.  For this purpose, we recommend using the 
assumption that marginal utility is inversely proportional to average income.  
 
Taking health impact into account 
 
Recent literature seeks to account for the human costs involved in conflict, particularly as 
these relate to the impact of conflict on mortality and health (Ghoborah et al (2003), Guha-
Sapir and van Panhuis (2002)).  These studies can usefully complement estimates of 
conflict-related GDP loss.  Increased fatalities and ill-health are the most serious human 
consequences of conflict, yet are not well-measured by GDP trends.  GDP is affected to the 
extent that death and disability reduces production of goods and services, but a 
measurement of welfare loss confined to production loss is clearly incomplete.  
 
Academic studies suggest that fatalities constitute only a small proportion of the total health 
costs of most conflicts (Ghobarah et al (2003)).  In addition to increased mortality during the 
conflict itself, civil war often has a strongly negative effect on public health in other ways, 
most notably through increased incidence of infectious diseases such as malaria and 
tuberculosis, widespread mental health problems as a result of post-traumatic stress, 
increased road accidents and increased violent criminality.  The World Health Organisation 
has estimated that 269,000 deaths and 8.44 million disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) 
were incurred in 1999 as direct and immediate effects of all wars, civil and international.  A 
recent academic study estimates that a further 8.01 million DALYs were lost in 1999 as a 
result of the delayed effects of previous civil wars. (Ghobarah et al (2003, p. 189)).11  
 
One method for quantifying this loss in monetary terms might be to ask how much people are 
prepared to pay to insure or protect themselves against other life-threatening risks (e.g. from 
traffic accidents or violent crime) and adjusting these (as discussed above) using 
distributional weights.  Such an approach would be fraught with methodological complexity, 
not least because security from large-scale armed conflict is much closer to being a pure 
public good, compared to the more mixed public/private character of protection against crime 
and traffic accident.  Nevertheless, it might be of some value in placing the risks of conflict in 
the context of the opportunity costs and trade-offs faced by developing countries. 
 
A comparison of the social costs of armed conflict and traffic accidents might be of interest in 
this regard.  Around 1 million people in developing countries were killed in 1999 by traffic 
accidents, and another 34 million disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) lost: around 2-5 times 
the estimated annual losses from armed conflict. (WHO (2002), WHO (2004)).  Crude 
estimates suggest that the annual cost of road crashes is about 1% of GNP in low income 
countries and 1.5% in middle-income countries (WHO (2004).  Further research would be 
needed before one could compare the relative social costs of the two phenomena.  Such an 
exercise might be of some value in informing resource allocation priorities at international 
and national levels.  
 
It would be possible to include estimates of deaths and DALYs from conflicts in the Spending 
to Save framework, albeit with considerable margins of error involved.  Based on available 
data for conflicts of comparable duration and intensity, case study authors could estimate 
many additional deaths and DALYs would be incurred in the conflict scenario, compared with 
the peace scenario.  As with estimates of GDP losses, this counter-factual approach would 
provide a relatively rigorous heuristic device, and could help guard against mis-attribution of 
health effects to conflict, when other factors are more clearly responsible.  The case for 
applying a discount rate to health effects appears as strong as that for applying it to GDP.  In 
                                                 
11 Interestingly, this study finds no impact of civil war in raising AIDS rates in the directly-affected territory, but a highly 
significant impact, statistically, on AIDS in neighbouring countries.  
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terms of ease of use, however, there might be a case for using raw figures, leaving it to 
decision-makers to include their own time-horizons in the calculation. 
 
Focusing on the two variables of deaths and DALYs, as complements to estimated GDP 
losses, would provide a useful and relatively user-friendly means of presenting the costs of 
conflict.  It would help to ensure that the two most serious consequences of population 
displacement – on health and on production – are fully taken into account, without also 
having to develop a comparative measure for refugee flows that fully takes into account the 
considerable variation in the duration of population movements and the severity of the 
conditions in which refugees find themselves.  
 
A similar methodology could be developed to take into account the impact of conflict on 
levels of education (measured in the HDI by adult literacy and combined gross enrolment in 
primary, secondary and tertiary education).  Again, this might measure the extent to which 
these variables change in the conflict scenario, compared with the peace scenario (Gupta et 
al, (2002)).  Methodologically, however, the use of input measures (enrolments) would make 
it more complicated to estimate outputs (i.e. educational attainment).  If a trade-off between 
complexity and utility is needed, therefore, our recommendation would be to focus on 
health indicators to complement GDP estimates in measuring the impact of conflict on 
human well-being. 
 
Towards a Human Cost Index? 
 
Projected increases in deaths and DALYs can be used to make cross-national comparisons 
of the effects of conflict, for example between the relative cost-effectiveness (in terms of lives 
saved per dollar spent) of intervention in Afghanistan and Sudan.  It can thus provide an 
additional means, in addition to the distributional weights already discussed, of making 
equitable comparisons between countries at different income levels.  By using absolute 
numbers of deaths and disability-affected years as indicators, it is based on the implicit 
assumption that deaths in low-income countries are as regrettable as deaths in middle-
income countries.   
 
For the purpose of relatively complex analyses of the impact of conflict, there may be a role 
for a Human Cost Index, using GDP loss and DALYs incurred as indicators and weighting 
them (as in the HDI) equally.  This would have the advantage of including two of the key 
indicators of the human costs of conflict in a single measure and could thus allow further 
comparative work to be done.  
 
On the other hand, for the purpose of presentation to decision-makers, an emphasis on the 
raw death and disability data seems preferable.  As explained earlier, there are significant 
problems involved in adding GDP costs of conflict to the directly affected territories and 
neighbouring states to those incurred by the IC.  Moreover, there is some evidence that 
Northern decision-makers view the prevention of death and injuries as the primary indicator 
of the effectiveness of CP.12  Given this, we recommend that future Spending to Save studies 
would maintain the separation of costs to the IC from those to directly affected territories and 
neighbouring states, but supplement this, where possible, by estimated deaths and DALYs in 
the directly affected territories and neighbouring states.  The issue of whether and how to 
include deaths and DALYs in the IC is discussed in Annex 4.   
 
                                                 
12  The UK Government’s Conflict Prevention Pools use trends in conflict-related deaths as an indicator of the effectiveness of 
its CP policies. Although the methodological flaws in using this information as a performance indicator are widely 
recognised, it reflects the high priority given to casualty reduction (compared, for example, to avoidance of GDP losses in 
developing countries) in the minds of UK decision-makers involved in the formulation of conflict prevention policy objectives. 
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Annex 4: Non-discretionary costs to the international community   
 
Much of the increased interest in conflict prevention (CP) relates to the possibility that conflict 
might generate costs to the international community that are unrelated to post-conflict 
intervention, for example through international terrorism, narcotics supply and oil supply 
disruption.  Yet there is very little literature available that seeks to quantify these costs in 
relation to CP decisions.  This annex will provide a short survey of this issue, and will outline 
possibilities for further research. 
 
What is the ‘international community’? 
 
In this study, the ‘international community’ has been defined as the whole world outside the 
directly affected territory and neighbours.  There is a tendency in donor circles to assume 
that the ‘international community’ is the same as the OECD, given that these countries see 
themselves as the main providers of ODA, finance for peacekeeping forces and global 
diplomatic efforts.  Yet, even when the IC is conceptualised solely in terms of its role as a 
supplier of international public goods, an exclusive focus on OECD states is misleading.  Key 
low and middle-income countries (such as Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa) 
provide significant international financial assistance.  The UN depends on developing 
countries for many of its peacekeeping operations, albeit often with OECD financial support.  
Large developing countries play important diplomatic roles within their broader regions (e.g., 
South Africa in Sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil in Latin America).  
 
Developing countries are an even more central part of the international community when 
analysing the global costs of conflict.  Where conflict contributes to hikes in global oil prices, 
African importing states are amongst the worst affected. Increased supplies of heroin from 
Afghanistan have severe consequences in Russia and Central Asia. Worsening conflict in 
Palestine and Iraq has demonstration effects throughout the Islamic world, increasing the 
risks of terrorism in Indonesia as much as, if not more than, in Europe.  There is little 
research on the extent of these wider ‘non-discretionary costs’ to developing countries, but 
reason to think they are substantial. 
  
In a developed version of the Spending to Save model, it might therefore be useful to 
differentiate between IC costs falling on developed and developing countries, e.g. when the 
main concern is with the effects of conflict on development.  For the purpose of calculating 
the cost-effectiveness of CP, such a distinction might also be of value, supplementing the 
distinction already made between the IC, directly affected territories and neighbouring states.  
 
What are non-discretionary costs? 
 
The ‘non-discretionary’ costs of conflict are those costs which the IC will be forced to incur, 
whether it likes it or not, or at least will find very hard to avoid.  Examples in our case studies 
include the following:  
 
• Increased migration of asylum seekers from countries at war ( e.g. into the member 
states of the EU as a result of the Balkans wars); 
 
• The consequences (e.g. attacks on New York) of international terrorism developing 
safe havens in ‘failed states’ (e.g. al Qaeda in Afghanistan); 
 
• The loss of oil company profits, and reduced international welfare more generally, as 
a result of disruptions to oil supplies from countries in conflict (e.g. from Sudan);  
 
• The consequences of increased availability of narcotics as a result of conflict and 
state failure (e.g. in Afghanistan). 
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Other ‘non-discretionary costs’ of conflict include: 
 
• The consequences for the international community of the use or threatened use of 
WMD in regional conflicts.  While this category is partly subsumed under the terrorism 
threat, there are also considerable global costs associated with the possible use of 
WMD by states, e.g. India, Pakistan, North Korea, or Iran.13  
 
• The consequences for the international community of the spread of infectious 
diseases in conflict-affected territories, especially if associated with the breakdown of 
cross-border transmission controls. 
 
• The consequences of conflict on foreign (‘international community’) citizens and 
foreign property in conflict-affected territories. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we focus primarily on the four categories of global ills 
covered in the case studies.  In order to highlight the issues involved in determining costs 
under these categories, we follow a two-stage process.  The first stage is to examine the 
issues involved in estimating the costs of the global ill (e.g. terrorism, narcotics, oil supply 
disruption) to the IC.  The second stage is to discuss how one might estimate how much of 
this cost can be attributed to a specific conflict.  
 
Categorising non-discretionary costs 
 
The total costs to the IC of global ills can be divided into at least four categories: 
 
First, as in directly affected territories and neighbouring states, these ills can lead directly to 
GDP reductions, for example through the destruction of property in terrorist attacks, 
economic recession triggered by oil price increases, or declining productivity as a result of 
increased drug addiction.  
 
Second are the costs involved in diverting resources towards avoiding the 
consequences of global ills, at the expense of other goods and services within global GDP.  
This has both a public and a private dimension.  Global ills can increase demand for public 
services, such as refugee support, drug treatment and police spending, which in turn must be 
financed by reductions in public or (through taxation) private spending elsewhere.  They also 
have a direct diversionary effect on private spending, for example by increasing the cost of 
corporate counter-terrorist insurance and protection, leading to increased anti-burglary 
protection in response to drug-related crime increases and encouraging increased private oil 
stocks in response to greater uncertainty of supply.  Counter-terrorist measures taken in one 
country can also impact on incomes elsewhere, for example through the impact of post-9/11 
measures on the ability of migrant workers to remit income to developing countries.  
 
The extent of these diversion costs will depend, to some extent, on the manner in which the 
IC responds to new or worsening global ills.  Thus, for example, the social costs of narcotics 
trafficking (such as increased criminality) might be reduced by providing addicts with legal 
alternatives.  
 
To some observers, diversion costs may be unnecessarily high as a result of over-insurance. 
The direct costs of the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, for example, were rapidly 
surpassed by the large resources devoted to increased counter-terrorist protection.  
                                                 
13  There are also large risks associated with inadequate management of WMD assets, most clearly in Russia, but these are 
not a consequence of conflict per se. 
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In addition to large additional allocations to publicly-funded security budgets, new regulations 
(e.g. on visa requirements and airline security) also impacted on private consumption, 
diverting resources into the transaction costs involved in travel and trade.  As a 2002 
Congressional study concluded, these costs constitute a ‘terrorist tax’, as a consequence of 
which ‘the real return on capital will decline and, over time, these costs may adversely impact 
both the economy’s productivity growth and long-term potential growth rate’ (Joint Economic 
Committee (2002): 3).  The cost of the US’s stricter post-9/11 visa regulations to US 
businesses alone has been estimated at $30 billion over 2 years (Alden (2004)).  
 
Yet even if some of these measures are viewed as over-reactions (and, in this case, much 
depends on the extent of one’s concerns about a future WMD terrorist attack), their cost is 
still a consequence of international terrorism.  For, in the absence of a terrorist threat, they 
would not have taken place.  
 
Most of the more detailed available estimates of the costs of terrorism relate specifically to 
the US.  There is therefore a need to develop more systematic global estimates.  If an effort 
were to be made to calculate the costs of terrorism on a global scale, however, it would be 
important to review the significance of distributional effects between countries.  UK 
Universities gain, for example, from tightened student visa regimes in the US.  Alternative 
tourist destinations may gain from reduced travel to Bali (and, if people stay at home, other 
leisure spending may gain).  Depending on the level of analysis used, such effects may or 
may not be significant.  At the very least, they suggest a level of caution is required in 
methodological design.  
 
Third are the direct non-monetary costs of conflict to the IC.  As discussed elsewhere 
with respect to directly affected territory and neighbours, deaths and DALYs are the most 
important indicators in this category. They include, for example, deaths in terrorist attacks 
and DALY losses as a result of increased narcotics misuse and related criminality.  These 
costs can be translated into monetary terms, but there are difficult and contentious issues 
involved in doing so.  It is debatable, for example, whether the value of life can be calculated 
simply in terms of lost productive potential.  There are also issues surrounding whether it is 
appropriate to use the same discount rate for deaths as for GDP (Collier & Hoeffler (2004); 
Addison (2004)).  
 
Such concerns can perhaps be overcome when developing the methodology for specialist 
audiences.  For presentation of cost-effectiveness results to policymakers, however, 
death/disability costs are probably best shown as supplementary to monetary costs, rather 
than being subsumed within them.  If one’s main aim were the development of simple 
decision-making rules, this would create methodological problems.  Yet a concern for 
elegance needs to be weighed against the desirability of presenting data in a form that is 
readily comprehensible by decision-makers.  In an area as politically sensitive as the value to 
be attached to the lives of one’s own citizens (and others) that might be lost as a result of 
conflict, leaders will not want to make such a judgement independent of the particular context 
in which these risks are taken.  It matters to politicians, as well as to people in general, how 
lives are lost. 
 
Fourthly, one of the most important costs of terrorism and increased drug-related crime is its 
psychological cost.  A direct consequence of terrorism and crime is that general public 
unease and fear increases, often to a very considerable extent, in anticipation of possible 
future violence.  The level of protective resources, i.e. the money that the public is prepared 
(through both state and private spending) to devote to protection against these ills, can be 
viewed as a first approximation of the negative value attached to these costs.  This is 
covered in the second category above.  Since protective measures are never entirely reliable, 
however, these costs underestimate the negative value of the ills in question.  For, if the 
choice were available, it can be assumed that the public would be prepared to pay a larger 
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sum to reliably remove the threats.  How large such a premium should be, however, is a 
matter that requires further research. 
  
Non-discretionary benefits? 
 
In some of the ‘global ills’ that might be worsened as a result of conflict, however, there may 
also be significant benefits to the IC, that could at least in part offset losses in welfare.  
 
This can be seen most clearly in the case of migration, where economic analysis typically 
shows that the movement of workers from low-income to high-income countries leads to an 
increase in global economic welfare, most of which accrues to residents of the latter (Martin 
(2004)).  There is little consensus on the direction, far less the extent, of the social effects of 
migration, although typically there is agreement that much depends on the skill mix and 
employment status of those concerned.  
 
In particular cases (such as conflict-generated migration from former Yugoslavia to other 
European countries), there do appear to be significant costs involved, including both direct 
expenditure (housing refugees) and indirect effects (increased criminality).  Yet these costs 
still need to be offset against the economic gains accruing to recipient countries by the 
contribution that immigrant workers make to their GDP, which may well exceed the level of 
output they contributed in Bosnia or Kosovo.  
 
There are also long term benefits to the IC accruing from higher oil prices, since current 
prices do not sufficiently reflect the contribution of oil consumption to global climate change.  
In addition to cutting carbon emissions, increases in oil prices could also have positive 
security benefits in the long term.  In particular, they might accelerate the transition of major 
economies to low-carbon energy production systems and thereby minimise the time during 
which the global economy is dependent on the continuing stability of a small number of Gulf 
states.  There may be an especially strong global-welfare case in favour of higher prices in 
countries – such as the US and China – which have failed to introduce high levels of retail 
taxation.  
 
While high oil prices may be beneficial in the long term, however, sudden reductions in 
supply (and consequent price hikes) typically result in substantial short-term costs.  Most 
notably, workers resist the reduction in real wages that oil prices require and inflation results.  
As a result, the International Energy Agency has estimated that a $10 increase in the price of 
oil would, other things being equal, lower global GDP by at least 0.5% in the following year.  
OECD GDP would be lower by 0.5% in the first and second year, recovering thereafter.  The 
loss of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa would be more than 3% and in Asia 0.8%.  By contrast, 
around $150 billion would be transferred from importers to exporters in the first year, leading 
to a significant gain in GDP for the latter.  Over time, the global economy would adjust to the 
price change and environmental benefits would begin to accrue, but the transition costs 
would be considerable (International Energy Agency (2004)). 
 
By contrast, it is hard to see any positive benefits to the IC from international terrorism or an 
increased global narcotics trade.  It is possible that there will be some positive externalities 
as a result of counter-terrorist measures, for example increased pressure against terrorist 
money-laundering can also help make it more difficult for corrupt leaders to send illegally-
obtained resources abroad.  Whether these exceed the negative side-effects of the war on 
terror, however, is open to debate.  
 
Perhaps the main lesson to be drawn from the discussion so far is that the level and nature 
of the costs that global ills create for the international community vary considerably, 
depending on the particular phenomenon that is being studied.  Table 1 summarises one 
possible qualitative assessment of the direction and relative scale of these effects, in relation 
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to the four ‘ills’ on which we have been focused. Further research would be needed, however, 
to make a more informed quantitative judgement on these relative costs.  
 
Table 13: Comparing the costs to the IC of different ‘global ills’:  
 
 International 
Terrorism 
Forced 
Migration 
Illegal 
Narcotics 
Oil supply 
disruption 
GDP loss 
 
-1 to –10 +4 -2 -5 
GDP diversion 
into responses 
-5 -2 -7 -1 
Deaths & 
DALY’s 
-1 to -10 0 -7 -1 
Psychological  
Insecurity 
-6 -3 -5 -1 
Other 
Externalities 
-3 to +1 -4 to +4 0 +3 
 
Scores out of 10 in each case, with positive ratings indicating a net benefit.  
 
 
Causation: how do conflicts contribute to global ills? 
 
Identifying the costs of various global ills is only the first part of the process of producing 
estimates of non-discretionary costs that can be used in the Spending to Save model.  The 
second, and essential, part is to estimate how far the presence (or absence) of conflict in a 
particular territory changes the total costs of the global ill.  
 
Once an assumption has been made as to the impact of the conflict on supplies to the global 
market, calculating the impact of a conflict scenario on oil price instability should be 
relatively unproblematic, using available estimates of the short and long-term elasticities 
relating oil prices (and consequent GDP losses) to sudden changes in supply (US Energy 
Information Administration (2002); International Energy Agency (2004)).  One possible 
complication is that global GDP losses are more closely related to rapid changes in the oil 
price, rather than its absolute level.  Conflict-precipitated supply disruption could therefore be 
much less damaging if it helps to shore up otherwise declining prices than if it contributes to 
steeper increases.  Even in this relatively straightforward case, therefore, wider costs may be 
highly context-dependent.  
 
As we have seen, the economic impact of increased migration may well be positive, both 
for the sending and receiving countries.  Yet public attitudes about immigration in most 
countries (including most OECD and developing states) are ambivalent and contradictory, 
reflecting a mixture of cultural, distributional and social concerns.  In practice, the costs 
and/or benefits of migration depend critically on the size and character of the migrant 
population and on the circumstances in which population movement takes place.  Available 
research on the general impact of migration on economic well-being may therefore not 
capture the particular costs and benefits associated with conflict-induced migration.  The 
different legal regimes through which guest workers and asylum seekers are handled, for 
example, may lead to significantly different economic costs and benefits.  The ability of 
migrants to relate to pre-existing support networks in recipient countries may also affect the 
level of social disruption caused.  Uncontrolled migration into rich countries is widely seen by 
political leaders as one of the costs associated with poverty and conflict in the developing 
world.  More research is needed, however, in order to quantify this concern in a manner that 
can be used in a Spending to Save model. 
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The main potential effect of conflict with respect to narcotics is to increase the supply to 
international markets.  Provided reasonably robust estimates of supply and demand 
elasticities can be made, therefore, it should be possible to predict what impact a x% 
increase (or reduction) in supply will have on the price for a given substance.  This in turn 
impacts on demand, with a 1997 study, for example, estimating that a 1% increase in the 
street price of heroin reducing the number of users by 0.9%.  Reduced demand, it can then 
be estimated, will lead to a reduction in related security, health and social costs, with 
attendant financial savings.  The same study estimated the economic cost of drug abuse at 
over $120 billion per year for OECD countries.  Global costs would be significantly more. (UN, 
1997) 
 
Such a method should provide a first approximation of the costs to the IC as a result of the 
(cut-off of) narcotics supply from a particular territory.  However it also needs to take into 
account the multiplicity of potential substitution effects that exist on both the demand and 
supply sides of a complex global market.  Even if the impact of sudden single-country 
change is dramatic in the first year, it could diminish over time as the potential for substitution 
into (or out of) alternative narcotics is exploited, and as production shifts into (or out of) 
alternative sources of production.  Were opium production in Afghanistan (the world’s largest 
producer) to cease forthwith, for example, global heroin prices would rise rapidly in response 
and levels of consumption would fall. However, increased prices, as well as pressure from 
trafficking networks, would provide an incentive for shifting production elsewhere.  At the 
same time, opium production is currently concentrated in a relatively small number of states 
(Burma and Laos are the next two large producers) and rapid increases in production in 
these or other locations (such as Central Asia) might not be possible.  Other things being 
equal, one might expect the risk of supplier relocation to be inversely proportional to current 
market concentration, but proportional to the time it takes to remove current producers from 
the market.  While a rapid removal of Afghan opium production from world markets would 
have a marked impact on global supplies and prices, in other words, a longer process of 
reduction would give more time for new sources of production to be developed, potentially 
reducing the benefits to be obtained from solving the Afghanistan conflict alone.  Alternative, 
but equally deadly, substitute narcotics might also be developed in this timeframe.  
 
‘Mobility’ concerns are also key to determining the impact of conflict on international 
terrorism, defined here as attacks on non-combatant targets outside the territory directly 
affected by conflict and its neighbours.  One of the major costs to the IC of conflict in 
Afghanistan, identified in our case studies, was that it provided a safe haven for international 
terrorists, who used it as a base from which to build the network that launched a series of 
attacks through the 1990s in Yemen, East Africa and, ultimately, the US itself.  
 
Some expert commentators have argued that modern terrorism no longer needs a territorial 
base and therefore that the denial of a safe haven in Afghanistan is of little value.  Others 
argue that, even if al Qaeda is now less welcome in Afghanistan, it is relocating its 
operations elsewhere, to tribal areas of Pakistan, North Africa, Indonesia, and elsewhere.  
 
In addition to their role in providing ‘safe havens’, conflicts between radical Islamist forces 
and Western-allied governments also provide an ideal recruitment and training ground for 
international terrorists.  This is certainly the case in Chechnya, Palestine and Iraq today, as it 
was in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s.  While drug production in one country often 
displaces production elsewhere, however, increasing support for violent Islamist forces in 
one place is more likely to strengthen such forces elsewhere.  Recently Islamist insurgencies 
in Iraq, for example, have undoubtedly encouraged (and perhaps also supplied) terrorist 
attacks in Saudi Arabia.  In calculating the costs of international terrorism that result from one 
particular conflict, therefore, it is also necessary to take these important transnational 
transmission effects.  
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In all of the four ‘global ills’ discussed in this section, therefore, there are formidable 
challenges involved in producing estimates of the non-discretionary costs of conflict to the 
international community.  We have highlighted some of the ways in which such estimates 
might be refined, in ways that we hope might themselves have significant value in informing 
understanding of policy options.  Not least, the ‘scenario visualisation’ involved in this cost 
estimation process can help highlight issues that might not otherwise have been examined in 
sufficient depth.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has highlighted the key issues involved in seeking to systematically analyse and 
quantify the cost of ‘global ills’ on the international community.  From our brief, and 
admittedly incomplete, literature search, we have found relatively little published in this area, 
with the partial exception of studies of the global oil market.  
 
Given the extent to which the ‘global ills’ of terrorism, drugs and migration dominate the 
security policies of OECD countries, especially as they relate to the developing world, such a 
gap would be both surprising and disappointing.  Our paper has pointed to some ways in 
which this gap could, at least in part, be filled.  If such work were to be done, it would 
increase the value of the Spending to Save model and improve the contribution it can make 
to existing processes of conflict analysis.  
 
Were further work to be done, it would be important that other non-discretionary costs to the 
international community (in addition to the four covered in this paper) should also be the 
subject of analysis.  Key issues to address in this regard might include: the effect of conflict 
on international capital flows, and the subsequent distribution of costs and benefits; links to 
international organised crime and international environmental effects of conflict; and the 
global (as distinct from national) impact of increased incidence of infectious diseases.  
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